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The World Trade Constitutional Court
Sungjoon Cho♠
Abstract

Although a court, as a judicial organ, usually fulfils its mission by

resolving specific disputes brought to it, it occasionally goes beyond
this simple dispute-resolving function and more actively engages in
building policies which define, and “constitute,” the very polity to which
the court belongs, as was seen in Brown v. Board of Education. If this
“constitutional adjudication” is an integral function of any domestic
high court, could (and should) an international tribunal, in particular
the World Trade Organization (WTO) tribunal, also play such a
distinctive role? This paper contends that the WTO tribunal has in fact
assumed such role by having recently struck down a hoary
antidumping practice called “zeroing” which tends to inflate dumping
margins and thus is a central vehicle for contingent protection
embedded in the antidumping mechanism. The paper observes that the
recent proliferation of antidumping measures as a new protectionist
instrument has motivated the AB’s hermeneutical departure from the
past interpretation which had endorsed the practice. This, it argues, is
a “constitutional” turn of the WTO which a positivist, intergovernmental mode of thinking, as is prevalent in other international
organizations such as the United Nations, cannot fully expound.
Critically, this turn originates from bold ideas which envision, and thus
“constitute,” new institutional meaning and possibilities within the
WTO. In other words, the AB’s exegesis is anchored firmly by a
discernible purpose of cabining trade distortive/restrictive
consequences from the use of zeroing which have long been left
unchecked. Finally, WTO members, the paper maintains, must
♠
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preserve the anti-zeroing jurisprudence as constitutional norms in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances tantamount to a constitutional
amendment. In particular, it must not be a subject of typical political
bargaining in the trade negotiation.
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I. Introduction

How much can an international tribunal contain member states’
behaviors when a treaty fails to enunciate any clear prescription for
those behaviors? Under public international law, in particular the Lotus
case 1 and the principle of in dubio mitius, 2 an international tribunal
might be inclined to grant maximum deference to sovereign states. For a
tribunal established by the World Trade Organization (WTO),3 such as
the Appellate Body (AB), this presupposition appears even more
plausible, especially when the tribunal addresses a domestic
government’s trade remedies, i.e., antidumping measures. Article 17.6
(ii) of the WTO Antidumping Agreement stipulates that when a
provision “admits of more than one permissible interpretation,” a WTO
tribunal shall validate a domestic authority’s antidumping measure “if it
rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.”4
Surprisingly, however, the AB, in a series of high-profile decisions,
recently struck down an antidumping measure (“zeroing”),5 despite the
fact that WTO provisions do not explicitly prohibit such measures. The
AB would simply have stuck to the textual ambiguity of the Antidumping
Agreement as to zeroing and would have endorsed it under Article 17.6
(ii). Even a panel under the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) previously upheld the same measure.6 In a normal situation, the
AB would simply have followed such pro-zeroing GATT case law, which

SS Lotus (France v. Turkey) (1927), PCIJ Ser. A., No. 10, at 18-19 (stating that
sovereign states enjoy “a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain
cases by prohibitive rules.”).
2 What is preferred under international law is “the less onerous meaning to the party
which assumes the obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial and personal
supremacy of a party, or involves less general restrictions upon the parties.” 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
3 Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations [hereinafter WTO Agreement], LEGAL INSTRUMENTS–RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND [hereinafter RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND], 6, 6-18; 33 I.L.M.
1140, 1144-1153 (1994).
4 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note _, Annex 1A, art. 17.6 (ii) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter AD Agreement].
5 See infra pt. II, § C.
6 EC – Anti-Dumping Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan,
ADP/136, Apr. 28, 1995 (unadopted) [hereinafter EC – Cassettes].
1

[2009]

The World Trade Constitutional Court

3

would have been a “useful guidance” for its opposite ruling.7 Given these
adverse circumstances, how is the AB’ uncharacteristic stance
justifiable? This paper contends that the AB aims to contain member
states’ use of zeroing to prevent the “constitutional” damages that
zeroing, if left unchecked, could inflict on the global trading system
through the manipulative proliferation of antidumping duties.
“Zeroing” refers to an asymmetrical calculative methodology in
obtaining final dumping margins. Zeroing omits any negative results
occurring when export prices exceed normal values (such as home
prices) and instead includes only positive results occurring when home
prices exceed export prices.8 According to one study, zeroing tends to
inflate dumping margins by nearly 90%. 9 The AB’s view is that this
unfair result from zeroing renders any pro-zeroing interpretation of the
Antidumping Agreement unacceptable even under Article 17.6 (ii) of the
Antidumping Agreement.10
The AB’s daring position against zeroing has sparked harsh
criticisms. The United States government, an ever-present defendant in
these anti-zeroing decisions, has denounced the position as an improper
form of judicial legislation because it “[makes] up rules that the U.S.
never negotiated.”11 Others have condemned the AB’s position as judicial
activism, asserting that the AB has violated the sovereignty-preserving
standard of review enshrined under Article 17.6 (ii) of the Antidumping
Agreement. Critics contend that this Article, modeled after the U.S.’
Chevron doctrine, 12 grants a wide range of deference to domestic
antidumping authorities.13 Thus, the critique goes, the AB should have
upheld the zeroing practice, which domestic regulators saw as

Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report adopted on November 1
1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R [hereinafter Shochu II];
WTO Agreement, supra note _, art. XVI, para. 1 (“[T]he WTO shall be guided by the
decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947”).
8 See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Appellate Body Strikes Down the U.S.
Zeroing Methodology Used in Antidumping Investigations, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 4,
2006).
9 Daniel Ikenson, Antidumping Reformers Rejoice, Cato@Liberty, Dec. 18, 2006.
10 See infra _
11 U.S. Sen. Comm. on Finance, News Release: U.S. Trade Laws and WTO, Sep. 27,
2002, at http://finance.senate.gov/press/pr092702.pdf.
12 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13 See e.g., Roger P. Alford, Reflections on U.S. – Zeroing: A Study in Judicial
Overreaching by the WTO Appellate Body, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 196, 200-02
(2006).
7

[2009]

The World Trade Constitutional Court

4

permissible under the Antidumping Agreement. One frustrated U.S.
politician even condemned the WTO tribunal as a “kangaroo court.”14
This paper responds to these criticisms and defends the AB’s
rulings on zeroing, out of which it also attempts to theorize
“constitutional adjudication” through interpreting the AB’s
interpretation. Admittedly, the AB’s departure from the old GATT case
law might be neither inevitable nor spectacular. Not all interpretive
shifts – even ones engineered by a teleological interpretation to
overcome a textual interpretation – deserve the “constitutional” label.
Critically, however, it is not the shift itself but the nature of the shift
which should draw our attention in this case. Both the subject matter
and the unique topicality of zeroing render the AB’s jurisprudential shift
a “constitutional adjudication.”
First, despite the missing Constitution – with a “C” – the WTO
may need to re-configure the power allocation between itself and its
members in matters, such as zeroing, which seriously restrict trade with
no justifiable grounds if the WTO is to achieve its ultimate object and
purpose. To that end, WTO’s fundamental (constitutional) norms should
prevail over any protectionist domestic politics. The unparalleled
institutional evolution over a half century, from a provisional pact
among a few contracting parties (GATT) to a full-blown multilateral
trading system as a public good (WTO), also tends to support such
constitutional function.
Second, in undertaking this critical task, the AB may depart from
the conventional role of a triadic settler (arbiter) of disputes, a role that
mostly applies given rules neutrally, and instead assume a new role of a
constitutional court. Such a reenvisioned role would allow the AB to
design a right system via a creative hermeneutics. As a result, any
normative implications of such constitutional adjudication would
naturally reach beyond the parties concerned in a specific dispute to all
WTO members.
Third, the unique background against which the AB has issued its
rulings on zeroing, such as legislative proposals to codify zeroing and
counter-proposals to reverse them, helps illustrate an institutional self
for the WTO. Controversies and debates over the AB’s adjudication offer
rich narratives within the WTO, which attempt to “constitute,” on their
own terms, desirable institutional paradigms re-configuring the subtle
power allocation between the WTO and its members.
This “topicality” of zeroing is essential in fully capturing the AB’s
constitutional jurisprudence on zeroing conceptualized by this paper.
The use of antidumping remedies has recently skyrocketed as use of
See Gary G. Yerkey, Sen. Baucus Calls WTO ‘Kangaroo Court’ with Strong ‘Bias'
Against the United States, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1679 (2002); Congressional
Record, S4308-26 (online ed., 14 May 2002).
14
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conventional trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, has subsided
through rounds of negotiations for trade liberalization. WTO members
now invoke trade remedies competitively with alarming frequency and
intensity. Since the launch of the WTO in 1995, WTO members have
initiated about 3,100 antidumping investigations. 15 In stark contrast,
GATT contracting parties initiated only 1,600 investigations in the four
decades before the 1980’s. More demoralizing is the antidumping
measures’ highly contagious nature.16 In what appears to be a defensive
attack, new globalizers, such as India, Brazil and China, have now begun
to imitate the developed countries’ penchant for antidumping suits.17
These new developments within the global trading system, this
paper argues, have prompted the AB to cultivate a new hermeneutics on
the Antidumping Agreement, one that envisions new institutional
meanings and possibilities within the WTO that resonate with its telos:
for example, free trade and global market integration. 18 This critical
choice flows from the AB’s firm consciousness of immediate and
powerful normative consequences, which its adjudication would
engender to the future of the WTO. To wit, the AB was well aware that
its adjudication would “constitute” the WTO, at least as far as this
particular issue (zeroing) is concerned. This is why the AB’s
hermeneutical shift on zeroing can be labeled constitutional. The logical
corollary of constitutional adjudication on zeroing is that WTO members
might not effortlessly overturn the AB’s zeroing rulings through mere
political bargaining in the trade negotiation. On the contrary, the paper
contends that WTO members should cement (codify) such constitutional
jurisprudence.
My thesis of constitutional adjudication in the WTO unfolds in
the following sequence. Part II documents a jurisprudential
transformation on the zeroing practice from the old GATT to the new
WTO. It demonstrates how the AB, through a train of decisions,
managed to establish an authoritative jurisprudence in this high-profile
regulatory area. At first glance, it may appear that the AB followed a
traditional, unassuming interpretive methodology based on “ordinary
meanings” of relevant provisions; a closer look, however, reveals its
genuine constitutional undertaking. Yet the AB’s exegesis is nonetheless
Regarding the antidumping statistics, see the antidumping section of the WTO
website, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm [hereinafter WTO
AD Website].
16 Id.
17 Major developing countries have increasingly used the antidumping measures since
the launch of the WTO. See id.
18 See Kenneth W. Abbott, “Economic” Issues and Political Participation: The
Evolving Boundaries of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 974 (1996)
(trenchantly submitting that political structures are not “corporeal” things whose
existence derives from “constitutive ideas”).
15
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anchored firmly by a discernible purpose: cabining trade
distortive/restrictive consequences from the use of zeroing against the
broader backdrop of a recent surge of antidumping measures. In other
words, the AB has predicated its decisions on “teleological” grounds,
such as avoiding unfairness from an undue inflation of dumping
margins and minimizing uncertainty in administering antidumping
measures. Methodologically, the use of interstitial norms, such as
fairness, tends to furnish the AB with maneuvering room for this
teleological interpretation.19
Part III then defends the AB’s new jurisprudence on zeroing. It
first introduces various criticisms against the AB’s zeroing case law, and
more broadly on antidumping measures in general. It subsequently
challenges the critics’ positions on the multiple grounds that they
misconstrue the nature of the WTO, its adjudication and the nature of
sovereignty itself. First, international tribunals, like domestic courts,
often engage in judicial rule-making via construction beyond mere
mechanical application of treaty provisions. In fact, a common law-style
judicial legislation has been a hallmark of the GATT/WTO jurisprudence.
Moreover, the WTO’s evolution into a full-blown legal system from an
old contract model under the GATT also proves that the WTO tribunal is
playing an enhanced judicial role. Finally, any “disarticulated” concept
of sovereignty mobilized to foreclose necessary discussions in this area
does not do justice to the contemporary status of global market
integration under the WTO system. 20 Innately self-righteous logic
enshrined in this hoary notion should not accord immunity to
protectionism reincarnated in zeroing.
Projecting the AB’s zeroing rulings against a constitutional
backdrop, Part IV attempts to structure the zeroing jurisprudence
through a theoretical lens of constitutional adjudication, which
authoritatively re-configures the distribution of regulatory competence
between the WTO and its members. Part IV also observes that the
sustainability of such constitutional adjudication can be secured not
only by exogenous factors such as domestic political support but also by
19 Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of
Norm Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 207, 212-21 (M. Byers ed., 2000)
(observing that tribunals employ interstitial norms “not because those norms are
obligatory as a matter of law, but because they are necessary in order that legal
reasoning should proceed”). These interstitial norms function as “standards” vis-à-vis
“rules” in an adjudicative setting. See Joel Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute
Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 350-55 (1999) [hereinafter Trachtman, The WTO’s
Domain].
20 Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 384, 393 (1994); Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103
ETHICS 48 (1992).
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endogenous factors such as normative recognition by the domestic legal
system. This “internalization” of the WTO’s constitutional adjudication
is self-legitimizing; it eventually contributes to the attainment of
domestic constitutional goals, such as Madisonian anti-parochialism, by
empowering a broader array of constituencies, including consumers and
consuming industries.
Finally, Part V concludes that constitutional culture in the global
trading community, which harbors and promotes a legal discourse of
constitutional jurisprudence among the community participants, is a
critical catalyst for both trade constitution and constitutional
adjudication. Because trade inherently connotes a “transnational” value,
participants – importers, exporters, consumers and investors – of the
global trading community tend to be susceptible to such discourse. It is
this constitutional culture within the WTO that liberates us from a
defeatist positivism that shelters protectionist measures, such as zeroing,
and thus unduly undermines constructive normative possibilities
envisaged by the multilateral trading system. Only this liberation can
redefine the WTO members’ interests, and their identities, from what
unreceptive sovereignty represents to what enlightened norm-builders
can accomplish.21
II. From Legal to Illegal: The Jurisprudential Transformation
on Zeroing

A. Dumping, Antidumping and Zeroing
Dumping is a pricing strategy under which foreign producers
export their products at less than fair (normal) value, such as at prices
lower than their home prices or at prices below the cost of production
plus normal profits.22 Antidumping authorities and the beneficiaries of
antidumping measures, i.e., domestic producers, attempt to justify the
antidumping system as a bulwark against foreign producers’ alleged
“unfair” trade practices which enable the latter to reduce the production
See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2004)
[hereinafter Cho, Gemeinschaft] ; Andrew T. F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded
Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the
International Trade Regime, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 81 (2006). From a standpoint of
sociological institutionalism, Martha Finnermore envisioned “continuing and even
increasing adherence to multilateralism – even when it runs contrary to expressed
national interests – because it embodies some set of values central to the larger world
culture.” Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from
Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 339 (1996).
22 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (stating that imports at less than fair value constitute dumping).
21
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cost.23 Since these discounted sales are legitimate under the domestic
(antitrust) law, unless they are motivated by a predatory intent, i.e., to
drive out rivals from the market, 24 a number of economists and
policymakers view the antidumping system which lacks such strict
requirement as a protectionist device.25 Yet the GATT/WTO “does not
pass judgment” on the fairness of dumping.26 Instead, GATT Article VI
authorizes importing countries to “condemn” dumping if it incurs
material injury to domestic industries by imposing antidumping duties
on dumped imports. 27 In other words, under these circumstances,
importing countries may impose antidumping duties on dumped
products to offset any allegedly unfair effects.
Under a typical antidumping investigation, the amount of
antidumping duties corresponds with the magnitude of dumping
(“dumping margin”) which is defined as a gap between domestic price
(normal value) and export price. In the United States, the Department of
Commerce (DOC) calculates dumping margins. The DOC determines an
overall dumping margin over a particular product under investigation by
adding up multiple dumping margins (“Potential Uncollectible Dumping
Duties” or “PUDD”) collected from various sub-product groups
(“averaging groups” specified by “Control Numbers” or “CONNUM”) of
the same product. 28 In doing so, the DOC ignores (“zeros”) any
“negative” PUDD (any excess of export prices over normal values) in
each group. Consequently, an overall dumping margin (a total sum of
multiple PUDDs) is inflated since the zeroing methodology prevents
those negative individual dumping margins (PUDDs) from offsetting
positive individual dumping margins (PUDDs). According to one study,
dumping margins would have been 86 percent lower if zeroing had not
been employed. 29 The DOC uses this methodology not only in an
original investigation but also in the subsequent stage of investigation,
See BRINK LINDSEY & DANIEL J. IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED THE DEVILISH
DETAILS OF UNFAIR TRADE LAW, xi (2003).
24 However, “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely
successful.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 589 (1986).
25 Alan Greenspan once observed that antidumping remedies are “just simple guises for
inhibiting competition” imposed in the name of “fair trade.” Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 725,
725 (2000) (quoting the former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan,
Remarks Before the Dallas Ambassadors Forum, Dallas, Texas (Apr. 16, 1999)).
26 WTO AD Website, supra note _.
27 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, art. VI; AD Agreement, supra note _, art. 1.
28 Regarding the detailed methodology of the DOC’s calculation of dumping margins,
see U.S. Department of Commerce (Import Administration), Antidumping Manual, ch.
6 (Fair Value Comparisons), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/admanual/index.html
[hereinafter AD Manual].
29 Ikenson, supra note _.
23
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such as an “administrative review” under which it may annually
compute a company-specific dumping margin upon a request by
interested parties.30
Suppose that a foreign widget producer makes two U.S. sales.31
The first U.S. sale (export) concerns Model A, and is given CONNUM #1.
This sale is made at fifty cents per unit with 100 units. The second sale
involves Model B, and is accorded CONNUM #2. This sale is made at a
dollar and fifty cents per units with 100 units. The weighted-average
normal value (home market price) is one dollar in both sales. The
weighted-average margin for the first and the second sale is 50 cents
and minus 50 cents, respectively. Each PUDD is calculated as a unit
margin multiplied by total units sold. In the U.S. sale No.1 (CONNUM
#1), the PUDD is 50 dollars, while in the U.S. sale No.2 (CONNUM #2)
the PUDD is minus 50 dollars. The total PUDD is a sum of these
individual PUDDs. In this example, the total PUDD would be 0 (50
minus 50) dollars.
However, under the zeroing practice the DOC ignores (“zeros”)
any negative PUDD before summing up. Therefore, the total PUDD in
this example is still 50 (50 plus 0) dollars, and the (weighted-average)
dumping margin, which is total PUDD/total value of U.S. sales, is 25%
(50/(50+150)). In sum, the dumping margin is inflated by 25% in this
hypothetical case on account of zeroing because it would have been 0%
((50-50)/(50+150)) without zeroing. This zeroing practice under the
ordinary (weighted average-to-weighted average) comparison method is
called “model zeroing.”32 In the administrative review, as in an ordinary
investigation process, any negative individual dumping margins
(weighted average normal value minus individual export prices) are
zeroed, which is called “simple zeroing.”33
B. The GATT Jurisprudence34: Zeroing Upheld
In EC – Audio Cassettes (1995), Japan complained that the EC’s
zeroing practice led to arbitrary results in the calculation of dumping
margins since the practice tended to inflate dumping margins vis-à-vis
19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (periodically reviewing the amount of the antidumping duty).
AD Manual, ch. 6, supra note _.
32 United States - Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for Calculating Dumping
Margins (“Zeroing”), Panel Report circulated on Oct. 31, 2005, para. 2.3.
33 Id., para. 2.5.
34 Unlike the WTO, under the old GATT system any party, including a losing party,
could “veto” the adoption of a panel report so that the report would not be legally
“binding.” However, even such an unadopted report is still regarded as a useful legal
guidance. See Shochu II, supra note _.
30
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the normal averaging (non-zeroing) methodology. 35 Japan therefore
argued that such methodology violated Article 2 (paragraphs 1 and 6) of
the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code requiring “fair comparison” 36 as
well as Article 8 (paragraph 3) stipulating that the amount of
antidumping duties should not exceed the actual dumping margin. 37
However, the EC responded that Article 2 concerned only those
circumstances in which normal prices exceed export prices and did not
cover the opposite situation where export prices exceed normal prices.38
While Japan accentuated the unfairness of zeroing by highlighting the
eventual consequences of zeroing, the EC simply adopted the narrow
textualist reading of Articles 2 and 8 from which it attempted to
legitimize the zeroing methodology.
The panel sided with the EC in its decision which was reminiscent
of the Lotus doctrine. 39 The panel opined that nothing in Article 2
prevented the EC from adopting other calculative methodologies than
normal averaging. 40 Therefore, an antidumping authority would not
need to consider any negative dumping margins because it would obtain
a separate dumping margin from each comparison between a price of a
particular transaction in the home market (a normal value) and a price
of yet another particular transaction in the export market (an export
price). Whenever, an export price exceeds a home price, such a negative
margin instantaneously becomes a zero margin under this single
transaction framework.41
Under the panel’s approach, antidumping authorities would
enjoy an option not to “aggregate” multiple results of multiple individual
comparisons between home and export transactions. Such option tends
to render fortuitous, and thus insignificant, the eventuality of final
dumping margins being exaggerated. Here, the panel ignored the
general necessity of aggregating multiple results of comparison in any
comparison methodology. It assumed, wrongly, that the necessity of
aggregation would occur only under an average-to-average comparison
methodology. Therefore, the panel rejected Japan’s argument for the
aggregation by opining that Article 2 would not require antidumping
EC – Cassettes, supra note _, para. 115.
The same rule now appears in Article 2 (paragraphs 1 and 4) of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement.
37 The same rule now appears in Article 9 (paragraph 3) of the WTO Antidumping
Agreement.
38 EC – Cassettes, supra note _, para. 119.
39 See supra note _.
40 EC – Cassettes, supra note _, para. 350.
41 Id., para. 356 (“[I]f the existence and extent of dumping and the imposition of duties
had been conducted on a transaction-to-transaction basis, the EC would have been
entitled to impose a duty with respect to dumped transactions, where injury existed,
irrespective of the prices at which other undumped transactions occurred.”).
35

36
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authorities to use exclusively the average-to-average comparison
methodology.42
The panel report was unadopted, reflecting high political profiles
which it engendered. Subsequently, despite intense negotiations under
the Uruguay Round, WTO members failed to provide clear rules on
zeroing. 43 As a result, this controversial practice had been quite
prevalent among the main users of antidumping remedies, such as the
U.S. and the EU, when India challenged the practice for the first time
under the WTO system.44
C. The WTO Jurisprudence: Zeroing Zeroed

1. EC – Bed Linen (2001)
Echoing EC – Audio Cassettes, the EC clung to strict textualism
and argued that Article 2 (Determination of Dumping) of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement rendered no guide on how to combine
individual dumping margins for specific product types to calculate an
overall rate of dumping margin for the product under investigation.45
The EC viewed that a “dumping margin” under the Agreement could be
established “for each product type or for each individual transaction” as
well as for the product as a whole.46 It would not be difficult to read
between the lines of the EC position. To implement the zeroing
methodology, one should logically recognize each transaction as a
separable segment (an individual transaction or a sub-product category)
of the product under investigation. Only in this way, can one avoid
including negative individual dumping margins in the calculation of an
overall dumping margin for the product as a whole. In other words, this
fragmentation of a product into autonomous transactional units
prevents any negative results in one sub-product (transaction) category
from offsetting any positive results in other sub-product categories.
However, in a surprising hermeneutical turn from the old GATT
jurisprudence the AB rejected the EC position. It ruled that the dumping
Id., para. 358.
Terence P. Stewart, Antidumping, in THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING
HISTORY (1986-1992), vol. 2, 1383, 1540 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1993).
44 See John Greenwald, WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law
Legislation?, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 113, 118 (2003) (observing that zeroing has been a
common practice in the antidumping communitry).
45 European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed
Linen from India, Appellate Body Report adopted on Mar. 12, 2001, WT/DS141/AB/R,
para. 11 (emphasis original) [hereinafter EC – Bed Linen].
46 Id., para. 12 (emphasis original).
42
43
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margin should be established “for the product – cotton-type bed linen –
and not for the various types or models of that product.” 47 The EC
should have “compare[d] the weighted average normal value with the
weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions,” which
include those transactions with negative individual dumping margins.48
Therefore, the EC failed to take into account these transactions by zeroing
the minus dumping margins.49 The AB invoked a general obligation of
“fair comparison” under Article 2 as it implied that the zeroing
methodology would entail unfair results.50 This is exactly what Japan had
presented in the EC-Audio Cassettes. Japan’s position, which had been
rejected by a GATT panel in 1995, was finally vindicated by the AB in this
case. This is the very first AB decision which struck down the zeroing
practice. Yet it was just a beginning of the WTO anti-zeroing
jurisprudence.
2. U.S. – Softwood Lumber V (2004)
The AB in this case reaffirmed the case law established in EC –
Bed Linen which defined dumping in terms of “a product as whole,” not
narrowly for “a type, model, or category of that product.”51 The AB delegitimized the U.S. zeroing methodology by denying its calculative
selectiveness embedded in zeroing. It viewed that the “results of the
multiple comparisons at the sub-group level” are “only intermediate
calculations,” not the dumping margin for the purpose of the WTO
Antidumping Code. 52 The logical conclusion is therefore that an
antidumping authority should “aggregate” all of these intermediate
calculations regardless of being plus or minus. 53 Because zeroing
basically cherry-picks only positive results of these intermediate
Id., para. 53 (emphasis original).
Id., para. 55 (emphasis original).
49 Id.
50 Id., para. 59
51 United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada,
Appellate Body Report adopted on Aug. 31, 2004, WT/DS264/AB/R, paras. 95-96
[hereinafter U.S. – Softwood Lumber].
52 Id., para. 97.
53 Id. Those who do not recognize this essential principle of “aggregation” argue that
the negation of zeroing would be tantamount to a situation in which “a driver should
not be found guilty of speeding if, along other portions of the road, he was driving
under the speed limit.” Alford, supra note _, at 208 (quoting Stewart, supra note _, at
1540). Yet this is a flawed analogy. Any individual incidence of speed-driving is an
independent infringement, while an individual computation outcome between normal
value and export price in a single transaction is mere an intermediate step to reaching
a dumping margin. A dumping margin presupposes a process of combination or
aggregation, if there are multiple transactions under investigations.
47

48
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calculations in the situation of multiple comparisons and disregards
(zeroes) negative ones, it does “not take into account the entirety of the
prices of some export transactions” and thus “inflates the margin of
dumping for the product as a whole.”54
3. U.S. – Zeroing (EC) (2006)
Mirroring the EC’s earlier position in the EC – Bed Linen, the U.S.
argued that the dumping margin “could be interpreted as applying on a
transaction-specific basis.”55 However, in line with the previous case law
in EC – Bed Linen and U.S. – Softwood Lumber V, the AB rejected this
argument by reconfirming that the dumping margin should be
established “for each known exporter or producer concerned of the
product under investigation,” as stipulated in Article 6.10 of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement. 56 The AB viewed that such interpretation
would be consistent with the goal of an antidumping regime which is
“designed to counteract the foreign producer's or exporter's pricing
behaviour.”57
In particular, the AB ruled that zeroing was also illegal in the
“administrative review” process, besides in the original investigation
process. An administrative review refers to a process under which upon
the request of interested parties the antidumping authority (DOC)
annually calculates the amount of antidumping duties owed by each
individual importer by comparing the price of each individual export
transaction with a monthly average normal value. 58 The DOC then
aggregates the results of these comparisons and calculates the rate for
each importer as a percentage of her total imports in the U.S.59 The AB
opined that the DOC’s “systematic” disregard of negative individual
dumping margins before aggregating these individual dumping margins
resulted in an increased rate of dumping for the importer. The AB ruled
that such systematic disregard violated Article 9.3 of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement and GATT Article VI:2 both of which stipulate
that an antidumping duty shall not exceed a dumping margin.
The AB based its decision strictly on textual grounds and justified
it from the standpoint of “customary rules of interpretation of public
U.S. – Softwood Lumber, supra note _, paras. 98, 101 (emphasis original).
United States - Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for Calculating Dumping
Margins (“Zeroing”), Appellate Body Report adopted on May 9, 2006,
WT/DS294/AB/R, para. 128 [hereinafter U.S. – Zeroing (EC)].
56 Id.
57 Id., para. 129.
58 Id., para. 109.
59 Id.
54
55
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international law” under the Vienna Convention on the Law of the
Treaties. 60 The AB might want to deflect the potential criticism of
judicial activism in relation to Article 17.6 (ii) through this ostensibly
literal interpretation. It seemed to be a wise move since rejecting zeroing
through pure construction would have engulfed the AB with heavier
attacks than it has invited under the current interpretation.
Interestingly, the AB opened a window for future “as such”
complaints against zeroing by endorsing the panel’s finding that zeroing
“does have general and prospective application.”61
4. U.S. – Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 – Canada) (2006)
The U.S. challenged the AB’s emphasis on “multiple
comparisons” on which the AB based its prohibition of zeroing. The U.S.
argued that the AB’s position would render “illusionary” the U.S. “right
to choose” different methods in calculating dumping margins. 62
According to the U.S., WTO members can elect not to aggregate multiple
comparisons. In particular, the U.S. presented a seemingly plausible
argument under Article 2.4.2 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement. The
AB’s “product as a whole” approach in the previous cases would not
make sense in a “targeted dumping” scenario under the Article (a
“pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different
purchasers, regions or time periods”) because two different dumping
margins would occur for the same product, i.e., “one margin of dumping
for transactions falling within the specified pricing pattern and another
for all other transactions”63 Moreover, without zeroing the Article itself
would be meaningless since two different methodologies, i.e., the
“weighted average-to-transaction comparison” for a targeted dumping,
and the “weighted average-to-weighted average comparison” for normal
scenarios, would produce the “mathematically equivalent” results.64
However, the AB blatantly dismissed the U.S. arguments. It
viewed them as a “non-tested hypothesis” since the U.S. “has never
applied” the weighted average-to-transaction methodology under the
second sentence of the Article (targeted dumping), nor “has it provided
examples of how other WTO Members have applied this

Id., para. 134.
Id., para. 204 (emphasis added).
62 United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada
(Article 21.5 – Canada), Appellate Body Report adopted on Sep. 1, 2006,
WT/DS264/AB/RW, para. 33 [hereinafter U.S. – Softwood Lumber (Article 21.5)].
63 Id., para. 36.
64 Id.
60

61
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methodology.”65 In addition, according to the AB the “mathematically
equivalent” outcome would be at best “limited to a specific set of
circumstances.”66
Having condemned the zeroing practice under the
aforementioned hypothetical scenario (the weighted average-totransaction comparison in a targeted dumping), the AB further moved to
strike down zeroing in yet another comparison methodology under the
Article, i.e., a “transaction-to-transaction” comparison for the same
reasons on which it based its previous rulings as to zeroing. It held that
“the use of zeroing under the transaction-to-transaction comparison
methodology is difficult to reconcile with the notions of impartiality,
even-handedness, and lack of bias reflected in the "fair comparison"
requirement in Article 2.4” because it “distorts” certain export
transactions (in that they are eventually zeroed) and consequently
“inflates” dumping margins.67
5. U.S. – Zeroing (Japan) (2007)
The AB’s anti-zeroing jurisprudence has reached its climax in
this case. The decision, which was dubbed the “death knell of zeroing,”68
has been the most sweeping and unyielding one of all zeroing decisions
in the WTO thus far. The AB struck down the U.S. use of the zeroing
methodology as such in a transaction-to-transaction (T-T) comparison
as well as in a weighted average-to-transaction (W-T) comparison. It
also illegalized zeroing under three types of administrative review
(periodic review, new shipper review and sunset review) both as such
and as applied. The U.S. repeated its previous defense that the zeroing
issue must be addressed “separately for each comparison methodology
and for each type of anti-dumping proceeding”69 so that an antidumping

Id., para. 97.
Id., para. 99.
67 Id., paras. 138-40. Furthermore, the AB noted that the unfair effects of zeroing tend
to be more serious in the transaction-to-transaction comparison than in the weightedaverage-to-weighted-average comparison because in the latter situation zeroing is
performed after individual transactions were grouped and averaged, while in the
former situation “excludes ab initio the results of all the comparisons in which the
export prices are above normal value.” Id., para. 141.
68 Daniel Pruzin, Latest WTO Ruling May Spell End of U.S. Use of Zeroing
Methodology, 24 Int’l Trade Rep. 83, Jan. 18, 2007.
69 United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, Appellate Body
Report adopted on Jan. 23, 2007, WT/DS322/AB/R, para. 87 [hereinafter U.S. –
Zeroing (Japan)].
65

66
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authority can enjoy the maximum discretion in its methodological
choice among different types of comparisons.70
Markedly, in addition to its previously seen recourse to textual
grounds 71 and practical damages to exporters due to the inflation of
dumping rates, 72 the AB rejected the U.S. argument from a rather
“teleological” standpoint, taking into account one of the most
paramount values of the global trading system, i.e., certainty and
predictability. It held that:
126. (…) If it is permissible to determine a separate margin of
dumping for each transaction, the consequence would be that
several margins of dumping could be found to exist for each
known exporter or foreign producer. The larger the number of
export transactions, the greater the number of such transactionspecific margins of dumping for each exporter or foreign
producer. This would create uncertainty and divergences in
determinations to be made in original investigations and
subsequent stages of anti-dumping proceedings.73
As the culmination of a series of anti-zeroing decisions for the
last several years, this ruling’s disciplinary range is quite broad, covering
nearly all comparison methodologies not only in the original
investigation but also in the different administrative review procedures.
This ruling seems to have delivered a clear message to the global trading
community that the era of zeroing is gone.
6. U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico) (2008)
In a shocking move, the panel in U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico)
explicitly defied the AB’s established anti-zeroing position and instead
reverted to the findings of panels in U.S. – Zeroing (EC) and U.S. –
Zeroing (Japan) which had upheld the “simple zeroing” in the
administrative (periodic) review.74 The panel in U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico)
Id., paras. 19, 21.
Id., para. 115.
72 Id., para. 123.
73 Id., para. 126 (emphasis added).
74 U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico), infra note _, paras. 7.106, 7.115. A “simple zeroing” refers
to the zeroing practice adopted under “weighted average-to-transaction” (W-T) or
transaction-to-transaction (T-T) comparisons between export price and normal value.
The simple zeroing is often conducted in the administrative (periodic) review which
starts after a year from the publication of antidumping duties. In contrast, the zeroing
practice under weighted average-to-weighted average comparisons is called a “model
zeroing.”

70
71
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emphasized that panels “are not, strictly speaking, bound by previous
Appellate Body or panel decisions that have addressed the same issue.”75
Interestingly, it found support for its position in Article 19.2 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which prohibits the panel and
the AB from “adding to or diminishing” WTO members’ rights and
obligations.76 It also claimed that its reversal of the AB’s position in this
issue is in pursuit of its obligation of an “objective examination” under
Article 11 of the DSU.
The AB, as had widely been predicted, reversed the panel’s
findings on the U.S.’ simple zeroing practice and invalidated this
methodology both “as such” and “as applied.” 77 The AB rejected the
panel’s premise that there can be multiple dumping margins, and
emphasized that dumping (and dumping margin) is an “export-specific”
concept which should be defined in terms of a product as a whole, based
on the textual interpretation of GATT Articles VI:1, VI:2 and VI:6(a) as
well as WTO Anti-Dumping Code Articles 2.1, 2.3, 3.4, and 5.1.78 The AB
also justified its position by the “context” found in various other related
provisions of the WTO Anti-Dumping Code, such as Articles 5.2(ii), 5.8,
6.1.1, 6.7, 6.10, 8.1, 8.2, 9.4, 9.5 and 11.79 Interestingly, the AB confirmed
that both French and Spanish versions of Article 6.10 of the WTO AntiDumping Code represent one single dumping margin (“une marge” and
“el margen,” respectively). Finally, the AB expressed its deep concern
over the panel’s rebellious behavior.80
7. U.S. – Continued Zeroing (2009)
In this decision, the AB delivered a coup de grâce to the zeroing
methodology in its entirety. Regarding the “continued use of the zeroing
methodology in successive proceedings” as measures, the AB sent an
unequivocal signal that the simple zeroing, which the U.S. had
continued to use in the periodic and subset reviews in defiance to the
previous AB decisions, was illegal.81 The AB’s position was particularly
definite in that it captured even the aforementioned “ongoing conduct”
Id., para. 7.102.
Id.
77 United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico,
WT/DS344/AB/R, Appellate Body Report circulated on Apr. 30, 2008 [hereinafter AB
Report, U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico)].
78 Id., paras. 83-86.
79 Id., paras. 87-93.
80 Id., para. 162.
81 United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology,
WT/DS350/AB/R, Appellate Body Report circulated on Feb. 4, 2009, para. 185
[hereinafter AB Report, U.S. – Continued Zeroing].
75

76
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as a reviewable measure.82 In a rare Concurring Opinion, a member of
the AB warned future panels not to further disobey the AB’s anti-zeroing
jurisprudence by relying on rulings of the previous defiant panels
(“pick[ing] over the entrails of battles past”).83
In a similar tenor, the AB ruled firmly against the U.S.’ recurring
claim that the panel violated the standard of review under Article 17.6
(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement. The AB’s hermeneutics was basically
teleological in this ruling. The AB rejected the AB’s self-serving
construction of the term “permissible” by highlighting that “multiple
meanings of a word or term [do not] automatically constitute
"permissible" interpretations within the meaning of Article 17.6(ii).”84
For the purpose of a “harmonious and coherent” interpretation, the AB
prioritized the first sentence of Article 17.6 (ii), which provides the law
of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, over the second sentence, which endorses “permissible”
interpretations. 85 Under the AB’s “holistic” interpretation, the first
sentence informs the second one, not vice versa.86 In other words, the
critical role of “object and purpose” of a treaty in clarifying textual
ambiguities, which is enshrined in the first sentence, should eventually
“narrow the range of interpretations” under the second sentence.87
III. Evaluating the WTO Jurisprudence on Zeroing

A. Discontents on the New Jurisprudence on Zeroing: Judicial
Legislation, Contract and Sovereignty
The bold jurisprudence which the AB has crafted in striking down
zeroing has invited a good deal of criticisms from various fronts. Some
contend that nowhere in the WTO and its Antidumping Agreement texts
as well as their legislative history (Uruguay Round negotiation history)
does an explicit prohibition of this practice exist. According to them,
therefore, the AB is “making up rules that the U.S. never negotiated.”88
In this line, the U.S. government has observed that:

Id., para. 181.
Id., para. 312.
84 Id., para. 268.
85 Id., paras. 268-72.
86 Id.
87 Id., para. 273.
88 See supra note _.
82
83
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A prohibition of zeroing, or a requirement to provide offsets for
non-dumped transactions, simply cannot be found in the text of
the AD [Antidumping] Agreement. (…) The issue of zeroing, on
which Members could not reach agreement in the Uruguay
Round, should not be left to dispute settlement. We as Members
should endeavour to reach an agreement on this issue through
negotiation.89
In fact, Article 17.6 (ii) of the Antidumping Agreement provides
that in times of ambiguities (when a provision “admits of more than one
permissible interpretation”) a WTO panel shall validate a domestic
antidumping authority’s measure “if it rests upon one of those
permissible interpretations.”90 In the presence of this Article, the AB’s
invalidation of zeroing which is not prohibited under GATT Article VI
and the Antidumping Agreement might be seen to amount to “legislating
to fill in the perceived gaps in the coverage of the Antidumping
Agreement” and thus violates the “standard of review contained in the
Antidumping Agreement that calls for deference to national
administrators of antidumping laws.”91
These discontents on the AB’s judicial activism may be
encapsulated as “judicial legislation.” 92 Judicial legislation exercised by
an overzealous trade tribunal would encroach upon member states’
regulatory autonomy in certain policy matters which they believe has
never been ceded to international organizations like the WTO. The way
in which the DSU is written might attest to this position. Under the DSU,
the formal mission of the WTO tribunal is merely to “assist” the Dispute
Settlement Body (i.e., the General Council) to “settle” disputes between
WTO members by delivering mere “recommendations.”93 As frequently
cited, these recommendations are not permitted to add to or diminish
the rights and obligations of member states.94
Communication from the United States, Offsets for Non-Dumped Comparisons,
TN/RL/W/208, Jun. 5, 2007, at 2 [The U.S. June 2007 Communication].
90 AD Agreement, supra note _, art. 17.6 (ii).
91 Alan Wm. Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 417, 421
(2001). See also Alford, supra note _, at 199-202; Greenwald, supra note _, at 114.
92 Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discrusive, Constitutional,
and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 247-48 (2004) (observing that a wide
range of commentators, such as scholars, practitioners, politicians and NGOs, have
recently accused the WTO Appellate Body of judicial activism).
93 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Annex 2, WTO Agreement, supra note _, art.19.1 [hereinafter DSU].
94 Id., arts. 3.2, 19.2. See Communication from the United States, United States – Laws,
Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”),
WT/DS294/16, May 17, 2006, para. 29 (“The perception that the dispute settlement
system is operating so as to add to or diminish rights and obligations actually agreed to
by Members, notwithstanding DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2, is highly corrosive to the
89
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Often, criticisms against the AB’s judicial activism become rather
emotional. Understandably, they originate from certain domestic
producers who compete with foreign rivals. They contend that
““zeroing” is one of the sinews of U.S. antidumping law. Abandonment
of “zeroing” would not be, as some have suggested, a methodological
tweak of Commerce’s dumping methodology or a minor concession by
the United States to mollify the WTO.”95
The U.S. Congress has been quite responsive to these anxious
voices. In a recent statute renewing the president’s trade promotion
authority (TPA, formerly known as the fast track authority), it explicitly
demonstrated its frustration over the AB’s interpretation of Article 17.6
(ii) of the WTO Antidumping Agreement in a way which has allegedly
deprived the U.S. regulatory agency (the DOC) of its rightful deference
secured under the Article. §2101 (b) (3) (B) of the 2001 TPA Bill
provides that “[t]he Congress is concerned that dispute settlement
panels of the WTO and the Appellate Body appropriately apply the
standard of review contained in Article 17.6 of the Antidumping
Agreement, to provide deference to a permissible interpretation by a
WTO member of provisions of that Agreement, …”96 In a similar context,
a group of ten U.S. senators sent a letter to the USTR and the DOC in
December 2006 anxiously warning that eliminating zeroing would lead
to a “dramatic weakening” of the U.S. antidumping laws.97
Facing these protests from the Congress, some commentators
warn that the AB’s disregard of the special standard of review might
deter the U.S.’ generous trade concessions in the subsequent round of
trade negotiations.98 According to them, the AB’s judicial activism might
end up with a Pyrrhic victory to free tradists.99

credibility that the dispute settlement system has accumulated over the past 11 years.”)
[hereinafter The U.S. May 2006 Communication].
95 House Committee Ways and Means, Joint Statement of Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action
Committee
and
Southern
Shrimp
Alliance,
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5468.
96 Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933(2002), § 2101(b)(3)(B).
97 Rossella Brevetti, U.S. Zeroing Methodology Hit Again by WTO Appellate Body, 24
INT’L TRADE REP. 53, Jan. 11, 2007.
98 Daniel K. Tarullo, Paved with Good Intentions: The Dynamic Effects of WTO
Review of Anti-Dumping Action, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 373, 374 (2003); Steinberg,
supra note _, at 261. But see United States General Accounting Office (GAO), World
Trade Organization: Standard of Review and Impact of Trade Remedy Rulings, July
2003 (observing that “of the legal experts GAO consulted, a majority concluded that
the WTO has properly applied standards of review and correctly ruled on major trade
remedy issues.”).
99 Tarullo, supra note _, at 374.
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B. Defending the AB’s Adjudication: Three Fundamental
Questions

1. The Nature of International Adjudication: Is It a Mere Mechanical
Application of Treaty Provisions?
Despite the criticism of “judicial usurpation,” 100 it is widely
recognized that judges, both international and domestic, do more than
merely apply rules in the book in a mechanical fashion. To some extent,
judicial legislation is an innate, unavoidable function of adjudication.101
To deny this preposition would be close to sticking to a myth.102 As early
as over a century ago, Ezra Thayer emphasized that the “growth of law”
via judicial legislation is not only “desirable” but also “necessary.” 103
Two decades later, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously ruled that
when we interpret “constituent act[s]” such as the Constitution, we must
be aware that “they have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely be the most gifted of its
begetters.”104 More recently, Martin Shapiro observed that it would be
“logically required” that any judicial discovery involves judicial lawmaking since no pre-existing norm completely covers future cases.105
After all, any norms, if left unchanged, tend to become outmoded, and
even anachronistic, as it fails to respond to altered realities with the
passage of time.
The necessity of judicial progressive development (updating) of
fixated text is no less acute in the international law arena than in the
domestic legal system. In fact, the need for judicial gap-filling may be
stronger in the international law setting considering that deliberated
ambiguities in the text are often a necessary evil for unyielding state
parties to reach any compromise. These textual ambiguities unavoidably
widen a gap between the black letter law (past) and the cases at hand
(present). Thus, it becomes a vital mission of any (well-functioning)
international tribunal to “seek consistency that connects past, present,
Ezra R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Development of
the Common Law, 5 HARV. L. REV. 172, (1892).
101 See Thomas M. Franck, Some Psychological Factors in International Third-Party
Decision-Making, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1221 (1967). See also Fabien Gélinas, Dispute
Settlement as Institutionalization in International Trade and Information
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 490 (2005) (observing a general trend of
judicial legislation in the post-war era) (citing Ran Hirschl, Toward Juristocracy: The
Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 1 (2004)).
102 JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 521 (2005).
103 Thayer, supra note _, at _.
104 Missouri v. Holland, 253 U.S. 416 (1920), at 433-4.
105 MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 29 (1981).
100
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and future.” 106 This is the very reason why international judges, in
interpreting treaty texts, “must have regard to the exigencies of
contemporary life, rather than to the intentions of those who framed
it.”107 In this sense, international adjudication, more than domestic one,
engages in a “dynamic” process of judicial rule-making, which produces
jurisprudence or case law.108 The WTO tribunal is not an exception to
this trend.109
The WTO’s unique institutional structure may further warrant
the case of judicial rule-making. The WTO suffers, like many other
international treaties, basic “positivist” predicaments stemming from
often stubborn and eccentric “wills” of state. The difficulty of converging
THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 335 (1995).
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the UN, 1950
ICJ Rep. 4, at 17-18 (quoted in ALVAREZ, supra note _, at 96).
108 See Alec Stone Sweet, The New GATT: Dispute Resolution and the Judicialization
of the Trade Regime in LAW ABOVE NATIONS: SUPRANATIONAL COURTS AND THE
LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS 139 (Mary L. Volcansek ed., 1997). Cf. David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884 (1996)
(discussing the “prevalence and importance of non-textual amendments”); HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
155-266 (1982) (addressing “judicial legislation”); EDWARD MCWHINNEY, SUPREME
COURTS AND JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING: CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW 168 (1988) (discussing the “imperative principles” of a novel jus gentium);
RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1985) (arguing that
“independent judges” in international trade tribunals can develop a jus gentium free
from the contingencies of the various States). See also Laurence R. Helfer & AnneMarie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to
Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 937 (2005) (recognizing the
inevitability of gap-filling and certain “minimal lawmaking” by independent
international tribunals). Cf. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International
Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1500 (2004) (observing many scholars’ view
that the “power of international institutions to interpret their founding instruments is
a significant source of authority for generating new rules”).
109 See Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part
One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845, 848-49 (1999) (recognizing the WTO
tribunal’s rule-making role). Joel Trachtman espouses the case of judicial rule-making
in the WTO dispute settlement system as he employs an economic approach of
“incomplete contract” and “rules/standards distinction.” Trachtman, The WTO’s
Domain, supra note _, at 350-55; Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of
Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 541, 547
(1994). Trachtman views that the WTO tribunal is “not simply a mechanism for neutral
application of legislated rules but is itself a mechanism of legislation and of
governance.” Trachtman, The WTO’s Domain, supra note _, at 336. In a similar
context, Kenneth Abbott views “legalization” as “delegation” which means that third
parties are authorized to interpret and apply those rules as well as resolve disputes.
Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, in LEGALIZATION AND WORLD
POLITICS 17 (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds., 2001). After all, it may be optimal if an
originally incomplete contract, such as the WTO treaty, which contains not only
definite rules but also more open-ended standards, may be filled in later by a judicial
organ.
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more than 150 wills tends to make any legislation under the WTO
extremely painful and thus impracticable. Legislation in the WTO is also
compounded by the daunting decision-making mechanism, which is
either consensus or supermajority in any important matter. 110 Under
these taxing circumstances, the WTO jurisprudence developed by the
WTO panels and the AB should be given more weight in terms of the
WTO’s nuanced institutional balance than in terms of the Montesquiean
notion of separation of powers that are better suited to the domestic
context. 111 After all, this is a useful manifestation of “judicial
prudentialism,”112 rather than as reckless judicial activism.
Predictably, critics of the AB would emphasize the textual
semblance of Article 17.6 (ii) to the Chevron doctrine, and argue that the
Article is a specific “rule” which must be directly applied, not
constructed, by the WTO tribunal in the same manner in which the
Chevron doctrine is applied in the U.S. court. 113 However, if one
categorizes the Article as a more flexible “standard,” the WTO tribunal
can certainly fill in the gap of an incomplete treaty, i.e., the WTO
Antidumping Agreement. In fact, considering the murky nature of
negotiation history under the Uruguay Round over the antidumping
issues in general,114 it would be only logical to construe the Article as a
standard whose real life applications have been delegated to the WTO
tribunal.115 According to the game theory, this interpretive flexibility is
to enhance “allocative efficiency.”116 One could reasonably speculate that
110 See notably John H. Jackson, Appraising the Launch and Functioning of the WTO,
39 GERMAN Y. B. INT’L L. 20, 39 (1996) (viewing that “the decision-making and voting
procedures of the WTO, although much improved over the GATT, still leave much to be
desired. It is not clear how the consensus practice will proceed, particularly given the
large number of countries now or soon involved.”).
111 See Donald M. McRae, The WTO in International Law: Traditional Continued or
New Frontier?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 27, 40 (2000) (arguing that the WTO dispute
settlement system fosters the “development of principles of international law through
judicial decisions at a much faster pace than has occurred under existing international
legal institutions”). See Philippe Sands, ‘Unilateralism,’ Values, and International
Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 291, 301 (2000) (advocating the Appellate Body’s “enhanced
role for a self-confident judiciary, filling in the gaps which states in their legislative
capacity have been unwilling – or unable – to fill”); Steinberg, supra note _, at 260. Cf.
Shimon Shetreet, Judging in Society: The Changing Role of Courts, in THE ROLE OF
COURTS IN SOCIETY 469 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1988) (observing that “legislatures are
generally slow to introduce law reforms to ensure that the law adapts to changing times
and changing social and moral norms”).
112 Cf. Russell Gabriel & Louis B. Sohn, Equity in International Law, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 277, 283-84 (1988).
113 Regarding the distinction between “rules” and “standards,” see Trachtman, The
WTO’s Domain, supra note _, at 335.
114 See supra note _.
115 Trachtman, The WTO’s Domain, supra note _, at 352.
116 Id.
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the Antidumping Agreement would not have come to light if disagreeing
negotiators had stubbornly clung to their own original preferences,
which had been diametrically opposite.
Despite its strong merits, judicial rule-making by the WTO
tribunal manifests itself in a much nuanced fashion. As José Alvarez
observed, “candid acknowledgment of judicial law-making … is a rarity
in international decisions.”117 In fact, Judge Jennings, one of the most
respected ICJ judges, once wrote that “the most important requirement
of the judicial function” appears to be applying preexisting norms even
when it “creates law in the sense of developing, adapting, modifying,
filling gaps, interpreting, or even branching out in a new direction.”118
The WTO tribunal, like any other international tribunal, is rather
reserved and circumspect in performing this inevitable judicial
function.119 This low-key stance results from the fact that the AB is all
too well aware of members’ anxieties over its potential judicial activism
and the subsequent encroachment on their sovereignty. Therefore, the
AB always endeavors to avoid any implications which may lead some
members to suspect that it overreaches its textually limited mandate
under DSU, i.e., not adding to or diminishing members’ rights and
obligations. The AB’s well-documented preoccupation with textual
interpretation, even when it in facts adopts teleological interpretation,
attests to this caution.120

ALVAREZ, supra note _, at 532.
MOHAMMED SHAHABUDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 232 (1996); ALVAREZ,
supra note _, at 532, n. 38; Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International
Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law or Its
Fragmentation, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 929, 945 (2004) (viewing that “judicial legislation
at the international level is a well recognized occurrence, albeit within limits of judicial
caution and restraint”).
119 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Promote the International Rule of Law?:
Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System, 1 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 25 (1998).
See also Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the
Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 647, 658 (2006) (observing that
“there can be little doubt that the AB's larger, if implicit, message -- that it will not
adopt or articulate a 'constitutional' understanding of the WTO's institutional
architecture -- was widely understood.”).
120 See notably Henrik Horn and Joseph H.H. Weiler, European Communities – Trade
Description of Sardines: Textualism and its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF
2002 262 (H. Horn and P.C. Mavroidis eds. 2005). See also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann,
Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court”: Some Personal Experiences as
Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE
605, 617 (2002) (observing that the AB emphasized the textual interpretation so as to
avoid criticism that it has modified WTO members’ rights and obligations in the WTO
treaty).
117
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2. The Nature of WTO Bargain: Is It a Mere Contract? (If So, What Kind
of Bargain?)
As discussed above, critics of the AB seem to subscribe to a
contractarian view on the multilateral trading system. They basically
view that invalidating zeroing is not what members, especially those
members which advocate zeroing, had bargained for in the Uruguay
Round negotiations. 121 On the contrary, the real deal struck in the
Uruguay Round, according to them, was to bestow considerable
deference to domestic antidumping authorities, which is allegedly
enshrined in Article 17.6 (ii) of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.
Those critics appear to deem this Article as a sacrosanct term of the
Uruguay Round contract. As a matter of fact, the Article was inserted at
the eleventh hour in the Uruguay Round negotiation at the U.S.’ strong
behest. No doubt, the U.S. did not want the newly created, and more
judicialized, WTO dispute settlement mechanism to restrain the
operation of its politically sensitive domestic antidumping regime,
which is a critical protectionist bulwark serving politically powerful
domestic producers. To them, Article 17.6 (ii) would be a Trojan horse
deliberately deployed in the middle of the multilateral trading system.
However, a contractarian understanding of the WTO may
overstate a positivist/realist nature of the multilateral trading system
and thus fails to fully capture its true aspects at the risk of committing
anachronism. Concededly, the prototypical construct of the post-war
global trading system was a sovereign contract dealing mostly with
tariffs, i.e., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The agreement was
negotiated, signed and implemented by “contacting” parties. Under this
originally positivist structure, both the formation and the operation of
GATT would be determined by power disparity or the so-called
“hegemony stability thesis” under which power is a main currency.122
Perhaps this is the reason why most criticisms on judicial activism are
staged by political scientists or politicians whose main language is power,
not norms.123
Yet, for the past half century the gravity of governance in the
global trading system has shifted from power to norms on account of a
remarkable institutional evolution which has transformed an erstwhile

See supra note _. But cf. Submission by Japan, _ (observing that there existed no
consensus on zeroing at the time of Uruguay Round negotiations).
122 See Hans J. Morgenthau & George A. Lipsky, Political Limitations of the United
Nations, in LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 143, 150 (Hans J. Morgenthau
& George A. Lipsky eds., 1953).
123 See e.g., Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and
Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603, 603-32 (2000).
121

[2009]

The World Trade Constitutional Court

26

contract to a “system.”124 As the former Director of the WTO Appellate
Body Secretariat Debra Steger once put appositely, the GATT turned
into “something greater than a contract that could be withdrawn from
by any contracting party whenever it found the obligations too
onerous.”125 In the same vein, the nature of the WTO remedies is no
longer obsessed with the “rebalancing” of their original negotiational
matrices of gives-and-takes, but more tuned in norm-building.126 In sum,
the WTO as a system, or a “trade constitution,” 127 continuously
transforms both the content of international trade law and state actors’
behaviors128 in a way which creates stability and predictability of the
multilateral trading system.129 From this perspective, the alleged term of
the Uruguay Round contract, which is raised by the U.S. in a self-serving
way, could (and should) not determine legal destinies of measures in
question.
Even if one arguendo adheres to a contract analogy in
interpreting Article 17.6 (ii), the U.S. is just one party to the contract. Its
interpretation of Article 17.6 (ii) must not be representative and thus
124 See Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. PITT.
L. REV. 763, 769-71 [hereinafter Cho, Remedies].
125 Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and …” Conundrum – A Commentary, 96
AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 137 (2002) (emphasis added). In a similar context, it can be said
that GATT evolved from an interest-driven “contract” to a norm-based “covenant.” See
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 424-25 (2000).
126 Cho, Remedies, supra note _ , at 792-95.
127 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 339 (2d ed 1997); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 101-04 (1998); John H.
Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 2528 (1996); John H. Jackson, Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations, 27 LAW
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 873 (1996); John O. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, The World
Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 573-83 (2000). Professor Cottier also notes
“while the GATT was an agreement the purpose of which was almost exclusively the
reduction of trade barriers, the WTO increasingly assumes constitutional functions in a
globalizing economy (emphasis added).” Thomas Cottier, The WTO and
Environmental Law: Some Issues and Ideas, Trade & Development Center Essay
Series, available at http://www.itd.org/issues/essay1.htm. Cf. Brian F. Fitzgerald,
Trade-Based Constitutionalism: The Framework for Universalizing Substantive
International Law?, 5 U. MIAMI Y. B. INT’L L. 111, 129 (1996-97) (arguing that “the
Uruguay Round of the GATT has presented us with a trade structure that no longer
seeks only to deregulate or regulate in the names of some narrow universal principle of
free trade, but that seeks to regulate sovereignties for the purpose of finding
universality.”)
128 ALVAREZ, supra note _ , at 588 (viewing that “international organizations have
changed and are continuing to change the international sources of law, their
substantive content, and the actors that make them, including states themselves.”).
129 See notably WTO Panel Report on United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act
of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Jan. 27, 2000), para. 7.76.
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authoritative. As the AB held in LAN, “the purpose of treaty
interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is to ascertain
the common intentions of the parties, which “cannot be ascertained on
the basis of the subjective and unilaterally determined “expectations” of
one of the parties to a treaty.” 130 At the same time, “a proper
interpretation also would have included an examination of the existence
and relevance of subsequent practice,”131 such as strong objections to the
zeroing practice expressed by other parties (to the contract), such as the
Friends of Antidumping.132
More importantly, the Article eventually fails to deliver what
sovereigntists believe they have earned through a bargain. An alleged
semblance of the Article to the Chevron doctrine does not necessarily
accord this international norm the same doctrinal content as the
putative domestic legal doctrine. To sovereigntists’ disappointment,
Steven Croley and John Jackson eloquently demonstrated why Article
17.6 (ii) of the Antidumping Agreement must not be interpreted like the
Chevron doctrine.133 First, an explicit use of different languages in two
situations, which are “permissible” in Article 17.6 (ii) and “reasonable”
in the Chevron doctrine, tends to oppose a similar pattern of
interpretation between the two. Second, as an international treaty, the
Antidumping Agreement must be interpreted in accordance with those
interpretive principles under the Vienna Convention on the Law of the
Treaties, especially Articles 31 and 32, not with the U.S.’ rules of
statutory construction. Finally, they aptly pointed out that certain
underlying rationales in the Chevron doctrine, such as “agency
expertise” and “administrative or coordination” cannot find their places
in the WTO context.134
Carlos Manuel Vázquez has also echoed Croley and Jackson’s
well-situated arguments. He criticized the Chevron deference in the
context of the Antidumping Agreement. He has argued that “Chevron
deference takes place in the context of horizontal judicial review,
whereas WTO adjudication is vertical judicial review” and that the
Chevron analogy, if used to interpret Article 17.6 (ii), would be
tantamount to requiring that “federal courts defer to state court
interpretations of federal law.” 135 Like Croley and Jackson, he also
European Communities – Custom Classification of Certain Computer Equipment,
WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, Appellate Body Report
circulated on Jun. 5, 1998, para. 84.
131 Id., para. 90.
132 See infra note _.
133 Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standards of
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 205-6 (1996).
134 Id., at 206-11.
135 Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Judicial Review in the United States and in the WTO:
Some Similarities and Differences, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. Rev. 587, 603-4 (2004).
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emphasized that the agency expertise rationale in the Chevron doctrine
cannot stand valid in the WTO context. He incisively observed that
applying this doctrine to the WTO would be tantamount to a U.S. court’s
deferring its statutory interpretation to those who are being regulated.136
The AB in U.S. – Continued Zeroing (2009) confirmed this
futility of the Chevron analogy. The AB ruled that:
273. (…) [A] permissible interpretation for purposes of the second
sentence of Article 17.6(ii) is not the result of an inquiry that asks
whether a provision of domestic law is "necessarily excluded" by
the application of the Vienna Convention. Such an approach
subverts the hierarchy between the treaty and municipal law. It
is the proper interpretation of a covered agreement that is the
enterprise with which Article 17.6(ii) is engaged, not whether the
treaty can be interpreted consistently with a particular Member's
municipal law or with municipal laws of Members as they existed
at the time of the conclusion of the relevant treaty.137
In conclusion, a contractarian analogy, which zeroing advocates
employ in justifying its validity, tends to oversubscribe to a positivist
understanding of the WTO and thus runs the risk of a misguided
assessment of the measure.
3. The Nature of Sovereignty: Should It Remain Antiquated?
A central theme revealed in those critics on the AB’s anti-zeroing
jurisprudence is “sovereignty” which carries a hallmark of the Lotus
principle. Under the well-known principle of public international law,
sovereign states are capable of doing whatever they desire as long as no
explicit prohibition exists under international law.138 Following this logic,
WTO members would be free to adopt the zeroing practice because the
WTO Antidumping Code does not expressly ban such practice.
Yet this “disarticulated” use of sovereignty may not do justice to
the contemporary status of global market integration under the WTO
system.139 There are plausible risks that protectionists may seek refugee
in an overarching claim of sovereignty. It might be too extensive and
inferential to accuse the AB’s decision on a regulatory issue such as
zeroing of actually eroding the classical notion of sovereignty as “self-

Id.
AB Report, U.S. – Continued Zeroing, supra note _ , para. 273.
138 See supra note _.
139 Wendt, supra note _ , at 393; Pogge, supra note _.
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government.” 140 Zeroing does not concern the sanctity of selfdetermination and non-interference in the area of national security as
stipulated and protected under the UN Charter. An “emotional appeal”
through sovereignty hiding “a surrogate argument by opponents of some
government proposal” 141 risks foreclosing otherwise meaningful and
constructive discourses on the allocation of regulatory competence
between the WTO and its members.142
Gravely, an invocation of a Baroque version of sovereignty runs
the risk of nurturing a culture of “veto” among members, especially
powerful members such as the U.S., and consequently poisoning the
atmosphere of international cooperation. Those powerful countries tend
to summon this ill-defined concept whenever they find compliance with
international law and cooperation within an international organization
politically inconvenient and cumbersome. This culture of veto may be
percolated to adventurous isolationism which could provoke some
governments to disconnect themselves from WTO despite the
Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law,
6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 841, 875-6 (2003) [hereinafter Raustiala, Rethinking Sovereignty].
141 John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: The United States
Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 157, 187-88 (1997) [hereinafter Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty
Debate]. See also Ronald A. Brand, Semantic Distinctions in an Age of Legal
Convergence, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 6 (1996) (arguing that “theories of
sovereignty borrowed from prior centuries can no longer accommodate economic and
political reality at the end of the twentieth century”). Dan Sarooshi also documented a
self-serving utilization of sovereignty as a surrogate argument for specific policy
preferences. He emphasized the essentially “contestable” nature of sovereignty by
submitting that “sovereignty is largely contingent upon the text in which it figures.”
Dan Sarooshi, Sovereignty, Economic Autonomy, the United States, and the
International Trading System: Representations of a Relationship, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L.
651, 652 (2004). In other words, the concept of sovereignty, despite its “prima facie
categorical use,” is subject to “conceptions and interpretations that should be evaluated
and maybe amended in order to account better for the values encompassed by these
concepts.” Id., at 654 (quoting Besson, Sovereignty in Conflict: Post-Sovereignty or
Mere Change of Paradigms?, in THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-4 (S. Tierney and C. Warbrick eds. 2004)). This view parallels
that of Stephan Krasner who regarded sovereignty as “organized hypocrisy.” STEPHAN
D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 9 (1999).
142 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 783-86 (2003). See also Raustiala, Rethinking Sovereignty,
supra note _, at 843 (observing that “prevailing sovereignty-based critiques are
instead usually disguised arguments about reallocations of power and the creation of
incentives and disincentives for policy choices”). But cf. Philip R. Trimble,
International Trade and the ‘Rule of Law,’ 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1027 (1985)
(reviewing JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES (1984)) (arguing that “the kind of
international law-making envisioned by the authors cannot be easily reconciled with
the American political tradition”).
140
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prohibitively high cost. 143 Undoubtedly, any of these consequences
would be perilous both to the WTO and those countries which might
self-excommunicate from the WTO in the name of sovereignty.
It is imperative that in this highly interdependent international
environment, trading nations, even the most powerful ones, should
embrace a novel concept of sovereignty. Trading nations should realize
that all international solutions necessarily involve “a degree of
intrusiveness into domestic governance,” which stresses the necessity of
a cooperative mechanism, including “appropriate allocation of power,”
between international institutions and diverse national legal systems.144
In other words, an altering international context requires a more flexible
concept of sovereignty145 which departs from that which is symbolized
by the peremptory exercise of unbridled power. Therefore, as Abraham
Chayes and Antonia Chayes argued, nations should adopt the “new
sovereignty” which is more mature, constructive and participatory.146
For this purpose, trade norms should be “disaggregated” to make it
possible to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of
reinforcing particular norms.147 This approach will enable governments
to identify and focus on important “policy” issues that confront the
entire international community, such as antidumping and the zeroing
practice without any unnecessary rhetorical escalation.148 Ironically, this
new approach to sovereignty can actually help governments achieve
their own policy objectives by taming parochialism in the name of
international obligations.149

Raustiala, Rethinking Sovereignty, supra note _, at 849. He aptly viewed that states
in fact join various international organizations to “lock-in desired policy outcomes”
and thus make any exit difficult. Id.
144 John H. Jackson, International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting, 3 J.
INT. ECON. L. 3, 10-14.
145 Cf.
Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and
International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 966 (2000) (reviewing STEPHEN D. KRASNER,
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999)) (introducing the “contingent and plastic” view of
constructivists on sovereignty).
146 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995).
147 Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate, supra note _, at 187-88.
148. Id. Cf. Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International
Trade Relations, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 775, 776 (1996-97) (asserting that nowadays
more States wish to regulate trade relations by using norms, rather than through
sovereignty and flexibility).
149 McGinnis argued that the WTO, unlike many sovereigntists’ lamentation, reinforces
its members’ sovereignty by protecting them from their Madisonian constitutional
failures precipitated by rent-seeking special interests or “factions.” John O. McGinnis,
The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 381 (2000)
143
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IV. Embracing Constitutional Adjudication in the WTO

A. Putting
Perspectives

the

Zeroing

Jurisprudence

in

Constitutional

1. What Is Constitutional Adjudication?: Theorizing Constitutional
Adjudication
Capturing the constitutionality of the AB’s jurisprudence on
zeroing involves “a dialogue of imagination and possibility” in that it
produces a new way (theory) of observing this particular reality
(zeroing). 150 It is a daunting challenge since the terminology
(constitution) is innately elusive and resistant to any fixed meaning.151 A
recently emerging wide spectrum of narratives on trade constitution152
appears both useful and distracting. While these narratives may provide
us with helpful cognitive frameworks by which we can re-formulate the
AB’s zeroing rulings on a more profound ground, various taxonomies
and perspectives which attempt to define trade constitution on their
own terms often complicate a coherent understanding of this tricky
notion. Nonetheless, certain critical elements, such as the subject-matter,
the function of adjudication and the milieu, tend to characterize in
combination the nature of constitutionalism or constitutionality within
the WTO for the purpose of this paper.

Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 623, 623, 645
(2006) [hereinafter Trachtman, Constitutions].
151 Deborah Z. Cass, The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial
Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International
Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 39, 40-41 (2001) (observing difficulties in defining
constitutionalism in the WTO context).
152 For example, Jeffrey Dunoff offered three (institutional, normative and judicial)
lenses through which one could capture trade constitution. Dunoff located an
“institutional” lens in John Jackson’s classical framework of the multilateral trading
system (GATT/WTO) under which a constitutional transformation from a “poweroriented” regime to a “rule-oriented” system through a development (evolution) of
institution, i.e., the “structure and machinery” of an organization. Dunoff also
discovered a “normative” lens in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann’s thesis which views the
WTO’s constitutionalism as pre-commitments on fundamental values, such as market
freedom or non-discrimination. According to Petersmann, WTO constitutionalism
effectively disciplines national policies “which tend to limit economic freedom to
domestic citizens and, for centuries, have discriminated against foreign goods, foreign
services and foreign consumers.” Finally, Dunoff unearthed a “judicial” (or
“jurisprudential”) lens of trade constitution in Deborah Cass’ thesis which focuses on
certain constitutional principles which the WTO tribunal has increasingly invoked in
shaping its decisions. Dunoff, supra note _ , at 651-56.
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First, constitutional adjudication basically addresses the
“governance” issue. As it is related to the WTO’s telos of antiprotectionism, constitutional adjudication is to “enable its members to
pursue common goals without being defeated by competing antisocial
conduct of members of the group.” 153 In other words, it aims to
discipline parochial protectionism which undermines the multilateral
trading system, i.e., legal disciplines over protectionist politics. 154
Therefore, the purpose of constitutional adjudication goes beyond a
mere settling of a bilateral trade dispute before the WTO court: it aims
to establish a general rule which other WTO members than parties
concerned will also observe in the future.
Second, constitutional adjudication concerns the WTO court (the
AB)’s deliberate departure from the conventional role of a triadic arbiter
whose main mission is “neutral rule applier.”155 It self-licenses to engage
in a “creative interpretation” in order to “giv[e] effect to the trade
regime’s primary purpose.”156 In this regard, Deborah Cass viewed that
the AB has adopted a unique interpretive technique (“constitutional
doctrine amalgamation”) which borrows from other constitutional
domains certain general (interstitial), constitutional principles, such as
rule of reason or proportionality. 157 Therefore, constitutional
adjudication eventually associates itself with broader and deeper issues
(values), such as “how to design a fair system of law.”158
Finally, a certain set of developments fashioning the environment
of the AB’s critical adjudication may help illustrate an institutional self
of the WTO. Topical controversies and debates over the AB’s
adjudication offer rich narratives in the WTO which attempt to
“constitute,” on their own terms, desirable institutional paradigms reconfiguring the subtle power allocation between the WTO and its
members. In sum, a proper constellation of interrelated factors, such as
the AB’s hermeneutical shift, a legislative proposal to codify the shift
and a counter-proposal to reverse the shift, tends to provide a unique
constitutional moment within the WTO which facilitates the advent of
constitutional adjudication.

JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 788 (1969) [hereinafter
JACKSON, THE LAW OF GATT].
154 Dunoff, supra note _ , at 649; JACKSON, THE LAW OF GATT, supra note _ , at 788.
See also Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National
Security, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 316-24 (1998) (discussing Professor Jackson’s
constitutional premise of international trade law).
155 ALVAREZ, supra note _ , at 492.
156 Id.
157 Cass, supra note _ , at 51, 67.
158 Id., at 52.
153
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Admittedly, the very invocation of “constitution” in the WTO
context itself may be provoking. 159 After all, the WTO has “no
constitutional court, no constitutional convention, [and] no
constitutional drafting process.”160 Nonetheless, any direct, un-nuanced
domestic analogy derived from the image of the Constitution may be illsuited in the WTO context. Despite such social contexts and institutional
paraphernalia as are different from those of states, the WTO may still
retain certain “constitutional features” to the extent that governance or
power allocation between the WTO and its members still matters.161 In
other words, the WTO’s institutional arrangement different from states
should not thwart otherwise useful constitutional imaginations within
the context of the WTO.
In this regard, constitutional discourse in international trade law
should involve various dynamic and flexible developments which may
“proceed along a number of dimensions, and in a number of different
institutional settings,” rather than “advance[ing] a particular
constitutional structure or agenda.” 162 This “plasticity” of trade
constitution enables WTO Members to willingly respond to certain
constitutional moments with adequate institutional changes.163 In this
line, one possible dimension of trade constitution, inter alia, which this
article concerns, may be defined as “a legal and judicial constitution that
provides rules … for determining supremacy and the scope of judicial
application of rules.”164
2. Why Constitutional
Interpretation

Adjudication?:

Interpreting

the

AB’s

On the surface, the AB’s hermeneutical shift in zeroing does not
appear inevitable. The AB could still have been faithful to the literal
ambiguities of the Antidumping Agreement as to zeroing and thus
endorsed it under Article 17.6 (ii) of the Antidumping Agreement in the
same fashion followed by the 1995 GATT panel. Here, the role of the AB
would have been an ordinary settler of trade disputes. There would have
Id., at 40 (quoting John H. Jackson, Lecture, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Boston, Nov. 3, 1999).
160 Dunoff, supra note _ , at 650.
161 Trachtman, Constitutions, supra note _ , at 625. Cf. Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Rule
of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflection on the Internal and External
Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 177, 189, n.38 (2002)
(observing that the Appellate Body has a “constitutional” nature or dimension in that it
interprets a “constituent document”).
162 Trachtman, Constitutions, supra note _ , at 645 (emphasis added).
163 Id., at 626, 645
164 Id., at 624.
159
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been nothing peculiar here. Furthermore, the hermeneutical shift, as it
happened, might have been deemed unspectacular as well: it might just
have been yet another change of interpretation. While it is true that the
AB employed a teleological interpretation to overcome a possible textual
interpretation which might have validated zeroing under Article 17.6
(ii),165 such teleological shift itself does not necessarily deserve the label
of “constitutional” adjudication. After all, neither all interpretive
changes nor all teleological interpretations should necessarily be
constitutional. However, it is not the interpretive shift itself but the
nature of the shift which should draw our attention in this issue. Both
the subject-matter (zeroing) and its unique topicality tend to define the
unique, constitutional quality of the AB’s hermeneutical shift.
Crucially, one cannot fully capture the significance of AB’s
hermeneutical turn without taking into account the current
developments on antidumping measures and implications that zeroing
exerts in those developments. Since the launch of the WTO in 1995,
members have thus far initiated about 3,100 antidumping
investigations,166 while GATT contracting parties conducted only 1,600
investigations by the 1980’s.167 What is more problematic is that while
major developed countries, such as the U.S. and the EU, used to be main
users of antidumping measures in the past, developing countries have
recently begun to have recourse to these trade remedies more
frequently.168 In particular, this proliferation of antidumping measures
is devastating to poor countries whose economic growth is linked
165 Regarding the AB’s refusal of publicly announcing that it conducted teleological
interpretation, see supra note _. In the same context, the AB refused to acknowledge
its teleological hermeneutical shift from permitting zeroing to abandoining it. Instead,
it simply disconnected from the old GATT jurisprudence in this matter based on
narrow formalistic, textual differences between the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code
and the current WTO Antidumping Code, and thus eliminated any need to disclose the
teleological root of its anti-zeroing decision. See United States – Final Antidumping
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, Appellate Body Report
circulated on Apr. 30, 2008, para. 132 (viewing that “the relevance of these panel
reports [under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code] is diminished by the fact that
the plurilateral Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code was legally separate from the GATT
1947 and has, in any event, been terminated.”). Nonetheless, one could reasonably
submit that panel reports under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code constitute the
GATT acquis. See European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas - Complaint by the United States, WT/DS27/R/USA, Panel
Report circulated on May 22, 1997, para. 7.26 (upholding a certain practice of panels
under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code); Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated
Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, Appellate Body report circulated on Feb. 22, 1997, at 22
(supporting conclusions expressed by panels under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping
Code).
166 WTO AD Website, supra note _.
167 Id.
168 Id.
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critically to access to rich countries’ markets. Even if the currently
staggering Doha round trade talks were to live up to its sobriquet
(“development round”) by generously allowing poor countries duty and
quota-free market access, rich countries could always impose hidden
extra tariffs on poor countries’ main exports, such as shoes, clothes and
catfish, in the name of remedying foreign producers’ alleged dumping
practice.169 These antidumping measures tend to effectively neutralize
any previously enhanced market access borne to poor countries based
on their comparative advantages.170 At this juncture, it may be worthy of
reiterating the fact that zeroing facilitates the progress of these
damaging events by inflating dumping margins up to around 90%.171
Against this alarming background, the AB has issued a series of
zeroing decisions. In a total of six decisions since 2001, the AB has thus
far rendered a very coherent and unwavering line of jurisprudence
which unequivocally rejects this problematic practice. It is this
resoluteness which distinguishes the AB’s teleological exegesis from an
otherwise mere interpretive methodology. Silhouetted against the
aforementioned topicality of zeroing, the judicial rule-making on zeroing
was the AB’s purposeful mission of institutionalizing a “proper test”172
which would shrink the domestic government’s administrative
discretion to null, and thus render a pro-zeroing interpretation
“impermissible” under Article 17.6 (ii) in this particular antidumping
issue (zeroing). In doing so, the AB activated a fundamental normative
force field which would govern the behaviors of all members, not only
those who were direct parties of the dispute, in a way which would
herald a new policy in this field (zeroing). It is fundamental in the sense
See Sungjoon Cho, A Dual Catastrophe of Protectionism, 25 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS.
315, 338-41 (2005); Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Doha’s Promises: Administrative Barriers
as an Obstruction to Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. _ (forthcoming 2008).
170 This developmentally fatal effect of rich countries’ antidumping measures is well
corroborated by trade statistics. For the last decade, the world’s richest countries’
antidumping measures have aimed primarily at low-income developing countries.
Since the launch of the WTO, the U.S. has initiated a total of 366 antidumping
investigations, 215 of which have targeted low-income developing countries. WTO AD
Website, supra note _. The EU follows the U.S. in this regard. During the same period,
the EU initiated 345 antidumping investigations in total, 237 of which were directed to
low-income developing countries. Unsurprisingly, most of these antidumping
initiations have concentrated on primary commodities and labor-intensive
manufacturing goods on which developing countries hold the main comparative
advantages vis-à-vis developed countries. If left unchecked, this developmentally fatal
trend might be enduring as the share of manufacturing products in developing
countries’ gross exports increases in the future. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS 2004: REALIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROMISE OF DOHA AGENDA xx (2003),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRGEP2004/Resources/gep2004fulltext.pdf.
171 Ikenson, supra note _.
172 Cf. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 203-04
(1985).
169
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that zeroing undermines the very telos of the WTO (free trade) and
defies the very identity of the WTO as a trade organization.
This constitutional adjudication is inextricably linked to a string
of developments which in combination may signify a certain
“constitutional moment” in the WTO. What the AB struck down in its
first zeroing decision (EC – Bed Linen) in 2001 concerned only a specific
type of zeroing (zeroing in a weighted-average-to-weighted-average
comparison). However, a large group of WTO members, consisting of
Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan;
Korea; Mexico; Norway; the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Singapore, Switzerland and Thailand
which are collectively coined “Friends of Antidumping,” seized this
moment to propose for the prohibition of zeroing in all kinds of
comparison methodologies in June 2003. 173 The Friends of
Antidumping proposal was vindicated by the AB’s subsequent acrossthe-board invalidation of zeroing. 174 However, the U.S., the sole
defendant which lost all zeroing cases, proposed to reinstate the zeroing
practice via amendment. 175 On November 30, 2007, the Chair of the
Negotiating Group on Rules circulated the “Drafted Consolidated Chair
Texts of the AD and SCM Agreements,” which attempted to compromise
between the AB jurisprudence and the U.S. proposal, but dissatisfied
both sides.176 In sum, those tensions and controversies engendered by
173 Proposal on Prohibition of Zeroing, Paper from Brazil; Chile; Columbia; Costa
Rica; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; Korea; Mexico; Norway; the Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Singapore; Switzerland and Thailand,
TN/RL/W/113, Jun. 6, 2003. (“Amend Article 2.4.2 to explicitly provide that
regardless of the basis of the comparison of export prices to normal value (i.e. weighted
average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction, or weighted average-totransaction), all positive margins of dumping and negative margins of dumping found
on imports from an exporter or producer of the product subject to investigation or
review must be added up.”) [The Anti-Zeroing Proposal].
174 See supra pt. II, § C.
175 The U.S. May 2006 Communication, supra note _; Proposal on Offsets for NonDumped Comparisons, TN/RL/GEN/147, Jun. 27, 2007 [hereinafter The June 2007
Proposal].
176 WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and
SCM Agreements, TN/RL/W/213, Nov. 30, 2007 [hereinafter WTO AD Draft].
Regarding reactions to the Draft Texts, see the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, Joint Statement by the Office of the United States Trade
Representative and the Department of Commerce’s International Trade
Administration, Nov. 30, 2007 (stating that the U.S. was “very disappointed with
important aspects of this draft text”); Statement on “Zeroing” in the Anti-Dumping
Negotiations, Statement of Brazil; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong,
China; India; Indonesia; Israel; Japan; Korea, Rep. of; Mexico; Norway; Pakistan;
Singapore; South Africa; Switzerland; Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu; Thailand; and Viet Nam, TN/RL/W/214/Rev.3, Jan. 25, 2008
(emphasizing that zeroing as a “biased” method for calculating dumping margins risks
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the AB’s zeroing decisions are testimonial to a constitutional moment, as
far as zeroing is concerned, in that they, together with the AB’s
constitutional adjudication, tend to shape the contour of an institutional
identity of the WTO as an international organization which upholds free
trade.
In sum, the AB has thrown to us, and answered itself behind the
recent train of anti-zeroing decisions, a “constitutional” question, i.e.,
how we should understand and construct the WTO in the face of
members’ policy options which could potentially compromise the very
goal of the organization. Here, the AB chose a different interpretive path
from the old GATT panel, thereby breathing a new life into the same old
texts, such as “a fair comparison between the export price and the
domestic price” (Article 2.4 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement and
Article 2 of the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code) and “the amount of
the anti-dumping duty must not exceed the margin of dumping” (Article
9.3 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement and Article 8 of the Tokyo
Round Antidumping Code). This critical choice was based on the AB’s
firm consciousness of immediate and powerful normative consequences
which its adjudication would engender to the future of the WTO. To wit,
the AB was well aware that its adjudication would “constitute” the WTO,
at least as far as this particular issue (zeroing) is concerned. This is why
the nature of the AB’s hermeneutical shift on zeroing might be coined
constitutional.
One important caveat is in order. Constitutional adjudication
which this article theorizes in this paper is entirely subject matterspecific: it is exclusively regarding the zeroing practice. Therefore,
constitutional adjudication addressed here should not be unduly
generalized and expanded to other WTO issues. Importantly,
constitutional adjudication on zeroing does not fossilize in general
Article 17.6 (ii), which may still provide ample deference to domestic
antidumping authorities on other antidumping issues. Moreover,
constitutional adjudication might not make sense in non-antidumping
contexts, and even if it does, it could feature quite different patterns
from what is described here. For example, if the AB were to adjudicate
another important regulatory issue of reconciling trade value and nontrade value (legitimate policy objectives), such as the protection of
public health and the environment, its judicial rule-making in these
areas would demonstrate different types of constitutional
adjudication.177

“nullify[ing] the results of trade liberalization efforts.”) [hereinafter The Anti-Zeroing
Statement].
177 See generally SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM
AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003).
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B. Normative Ramifications of Constitutional Adjudication on
Zeroing

1. Could WTO Members Overturn Constitutional Adjudication?
After losing a series of zeroing cases under the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, the U.S. proposed that zeroing be ultimately
resolved through negotiations, instead of being left to adjudication.178
Naturally, the U.S. suggested that relevant provisions of the
Antidumping Agreement, such as Articles 2.4 and 9.3, be amended in a
way which explicitly endorses zeroing.179 The U.S.’ drive for negotiation
prompted the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules, the Uruguayan
Ambassador Guillermo Valles Games, to circulate on November 30,
2007 the “Drafted Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM
Agreements” which “[he] believe[d] could facilitate the negotiation of a
balanced outcome.”180
The Chair’s draft text on zeroing appears to be a compromise
between the current WTO case law and the U.S. proposal. While the text
prohibits zeroing in “multiple comparisons of a weighted average
normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export
transactions,” it permits zeroing “on a transaction-to-transaction basis
or of multiple comparisons of individual export transactions to a
weighted average normal value” as well as in case of administrative
reviews.181 A large group of countries opposing zeroing criticized the text.
They emphasized that zeroing as a “biased” method for calculating
dumping margins risks “nullify[ing] the results of trade liberalization
efforts.”182 The Chair subsequently conceded that there simply existed
“no hints on possible middle ground approaches nor suggestions for
possible compromises or trade-offs.”183
Considering these diametrically opposite views on zeroing among
major WTO members as well as the inchoate stage of WTO negotiations
in this controversial issue, any pro-zeroing amendment of the

The U.S. June 2007 Communication, supra note _.
The U.S. proposed to add the following paragraph: “Authorities are not required to
offset the results of any comparison in which the export price is greater than the
normal value against the results of any comparison in which the normal value is
greater than the export price.” The U.S. May 2006 Communication, supra note _; The
U.S. June 2007 Proposal, supra note _.
180 WTO AD Draft, supra note _.
181 Id.
182 The Anti-Zeroing Statement, supra note _.
183 WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Working Document from the Chairman,
TN/RL/W/232, May 28, 2008, at 1, A-10, A-11.
178
179
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Antidumping Agreement is highly unlikely, at least in the near future.184
Nonetheless, if such amendment should ever transpire, would it trump
the outcome of the AB’s constitutional adjudication (constitutional
jurisprudence)?
Purely from a normative standpoint, one might argue that it
should not. According to this position, since constitutional
jurisprudence on zeroing directly addresses the most essential value
(telos) of the WTO system, such as anti-protectionism, even an
amendment of WTO norms should not repeal this fundamental norm.185
This preemptive, per se invalid position tends to distinguish
constitutional jurisprudence from other WTO case laws concerning
more mundane trade disputes whose outcome may be altered by
subsequent negotiations.
However, this position appears not only infeasible but also
illogical. The existence of one constitutional norm (anti-zeroing
jurisprudence) should not unduly block any future constitutional
dynamics under the WTO. One might logically envision a situation in
which WTO members might need to modify, if not repeal, even this
jurisprudence via a constitutional amendment, such as a revision of the
WTO Charter and/or the WTO Antidumping Agreement.
Nevertheless, WTO members must not entertain any lax
overriding of such paramount constitutional jurisprudence, for example
repealing the constitutional jurisprudence through a soft norm, such as
a decision or a declaration by Ministers186 simply as a result mundane
bargaining in the trade negotiation, as is currently conducted in
Negotiating Group on Rules. 187 This lower threshold in nullifying
constitutional norms risks over-politicizing the WTO’s normative
operation in this important area.188 In this sense, the legal status of antizeroing jurisprudence might be analogous to a strong version of the U.S.
184 See Jonathan Lynn, Anti-Dumping Row Roils WTO, Isolates U.S., REUTERS, Jan. 10,
2008 (quoting Brendan McGivern who observed that “it’s wildly optimistic of the U.S.
to think they’ll get this back through negotiations”).
185 See The Anti-Zeroing Statement, supra note _.
186 See Mary E. Footer, The Role of 'Soft' Law Norms in Reconciling the Antinomies of
WTO Law (July 14, 2008), Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural
Conference 2008 Paper, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159929, at 1213 (observing that soft norms, such as a “decision,” are subject to a hardening process,
such as an “amendment”). According to Footer, it is conceivable that a decision
remains unamended. Id.
187 Currently, most WTO members approach this issue not even through “negotiation”
but rather merely as “discussion.” WTO: 2008 News Items, Lamy Urges “Maximum
Effort” for July Meeting of Ministers, Jun. 27, 2008.
188 Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, What’s Wrong with Constitutional Amendments, in
GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS: DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 39 (1999) (warning that frequent constitutional amendments might be used as
“a chip in short-run political games”).
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“constitutional common law,” which survives an ordinary legislative
challenge yet is still subject to a subsequent constitutional
amendment. 189 In other words, procedural rigors built in Article X
(Amendment) of the WTO Agreement, including a super majority
rule,190 must govern any modification of the zeroing jurisprudence. A
simple decision or declaration engineered by a negotiation must not
immediately overturn it without a formal amendment.
On the contrary, under an ideal scenario WTO members should
“codify” the outcome of constitutional adjudication, i.e., the AB’s antizeroing case law.191
2. Could a Lower Tribunal (Panel) Reject Constitutional Adjudication?
Despite the well-established anti-zeroing jurisprudence, a recent
panel in U.S. - Zeroing (Mexico) explicitly rejected the AB’s positions, in
particular those in U.S. – Zeroing (EC) and U.S. – Zeroing (Japan), and
instead followed the same line of reasoning which two previous panels
had employed in these cases. 192 These cases concerned, inter alia, a
A strong version of constitutional common law, which I analogize here, refers to
certain constitutional rules which are “elaborated by judges through precedent-based
reasoning” and “not defeasible by ordinary legislation.” See generally David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). See also
Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law,
CHICAGO PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER No. 73, at 1, n.2. In contrast, a
soft version of constitutional common law envisions being overturned by legislation.
See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term – Forward:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
190 WTO Agreement, supra note _ , art. X, paras. 1 and 3 (“Amendments to provisions
of this Agreement, or of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1A and 1C,
other than those listed in paragraphs 2 and 6, of a nature that would alter the rights
and obligations of the Members, shall take effect for the Members that have accepted
them upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members and thereafter for each other
Member upon acceptance by it.”).
191 A group of countries, such as Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong,
China; Israel; Japan; Korea; Mexico; Norway; the Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Singapore, Switzerland and Thailand, which are
collectively called the “Friends of Antidumping” proposed for the prohibition of
zeroing in all kinds of comparison methodologies in June 2003. They proposed to
“amend Article 2.4.2 to explicitly provide that regardless of the basis of the comparison
of export prices to normal value (i.e. weighted average-to-weighted average or
transaction-to-transaction, or weighted average-to-transaction), all positive margins of
dumping and negative margins of dumping found on imports from an exporter or
producer of the product subject to investigation or review must be added up.” The
Anti-Zeroing Proposal, supra note _.
192 United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico,
Report of the Panel, WT/DS344/R, Dec. 20, 2007, para. 7.106 (“[W]e have decided
that we have no option but to respectfully disagree with the line of reasoning developed
189
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“simple zeroing” in the administrative (periodic) review.193 Although the
U.S. - Zeroing (Mexico) panel admitted that the AB “de facto expects”
the panel to respect adopted AB reports “to the extent that the legal
issues are similar,” 194 it emphasized that panels “are not, strictly
speaking, bound by previous Appellate Body or panel decisions that
have addressed the same issue.”195 However, the panel’s stance here is
unacceptable for the following reasons as long as one envisions the
notion of constitutional adjudication in this matter.
First of all, the panel exaggerated the technical deficiency of legal
bindingness of AB decisions. No matter how one may label the WTO
jurisprudence, it has never been the label itself which has actually
bestowed compliance pull upon those decisions. 196 Regardless of the
label, members perceive these precedents as well-established
“jurisprudence” which they voluntarily observe: they cite, quote and
reference the AB’s precedents to substantiate and reinforce their own
legal positions in the dispute. While not all members abide by the WTO
jurisprudence all the time, such breaches do not necessarily nullify the
legal authority of the jurisprudence. In particular, if such jurisprudence
concerns constitutional issues, such as zeroing, its compliance pull tends
to be stronger than other situations as members fully appreciate the
normative weight of such jurisprudence. Perhaps this heightened
compliance pull can explain the EC’s swift change of course the moment
the AB struck down its own zeroing practice in 2001.197
Second, as discussed above, constitutional adjudication on
zeroing normatively prevails even over members’ attempt to modify its
outcome through political bargaining (amendment). If constitutional
adjudication should govern members’ behaviors, it should also regulate
panels’ rulings. Otherwise, the normative superiority flowing from
constitutional adjudication would be meaningless.
Third, the U.S. - Zeroing (Mexico) panel rationalized its defiance
by invoking DSU Article 19.2 which prohibits both the panel and the AB
from “adding to or diminishing” WTO members’ rights and
obligations.198 In other words, the panel implied that the AB diminished
the U.S.’ rights under the WTO norms by judicially enacting a new
by the Appellate Body regarding the WTO-consistency of simple zeroing in periodic
reviews.”) [hereinafter U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico)].
193 Id., paras. 7.106, 7.115.
194 Id., para. 7.105.
195 Id., para. 7.102.
196 Cf. Gélinas, supra note _ , at 493 (observing that the precedent effect in the WTO
does not originate strictly from the “stare decisis” but rather from a concern for
“formal justice” which is interested in preserving the “security and predictability” of
the multilateral trading system).
197 See supra pt. II, § C.
198 U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico), supra note _ , para. 7.102.
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proscription on zeroing. However, the very idea of constitutional
adjudication tends to prevent the panel from making such self-assured
determination. Especially because it regards a “constitutional” issue, a
WTO panel, as a lower tribunal, is not entitled to question the validity of
the decision rendered by the AB as a constitutional tribunal. Moreover,
the panel’s justification for departing from the AB’s constitutional
jurisprudence is itself groundless: the AB’s constitutional adjudication
never diminishes members’ WTO rights and obligations: it simply
“clarifies” them from the standpoint of trade constitution.
Sharing the same position, the AB in U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico)
rightly rejected the panel’s position in this issue. It emphasized that the
fact that AB reports may not be “binding” per se does not free panels
from observing previous reports. 199 The AB reiterated its previous
findings that adopted AB reports create “legitimate expectations” among
WTO members and that panels’ observance with those reports would
also be expected. 200 The AB justified its position with a critical
observation on the value of “jurisprudence” within the WTO, which is
arguably the most important dicta in this question.
160. (…) Adopted panel and Appellate Body reports are often
cited by parties in support of legal arguments in dispute
settlement proceedings, and are relied upon by panels and the
Appellate Body in subsequent disputes. In addition, when
enacting or modifying laws and national regulations pertaining to
international trade matters, WTO Members take into account the
legal interpretation of the covered agreements developed in
adopted panel and Appellate Body reports. (…)201
The AB did not forget to admonish the panel’s unusual behavior.
With a solemn tone, it emphasized that the panel’s defiance is against
the hierarchical division of labor in DSU under which only the AB can
“uphold, modify or reverse” panels’ legal interpretations. 202 The AB
expressed its deep concern over the panel’s rebellious behavior.203
In the most recent zeroing dispute (U.S. – Continued Zeroing),
the panel did follow the AB’s well-established anti-zeroing jurisprudence
unlike previous panels, which had defied the AB. Yet the panel did so
only reluctantly. The panel still viewed those decisions by defiant panels

AB Report, U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico), supra note _ , para. 158.
Id., para. 159
201 Id., para. 160.
202 Id., para. 161.
203 Id., para. 162.
199

200
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as “persuasive,”204 although it eventually struck down the U.S.’ zeroing
practices for the sake of the WTO jurisprudence.205 In response, a rare
Concurring Opinion eventually tolled the death knell on zeroing by
declaring that:
312. (…) In matters of adjudication, there must be an end to every
great debate. The Appellate Body exists to clarify the meaning of
the covered agreements. On the question of zeroing it has spoken
definitively. Its decisions have been adopted by the DSB. The
membership of the WTO is entitled to rely upon these outcomes.
(…) At a point in every debate, there comes a time when it is more
important for the system of dispute resolution to have a definitive
outcome, than further to pick over the entrails of battles past.
With respect to zeroing, that time has come.206
C. The Sustainability of the WTO’s Constitutional Adjudication
on Zeroing

1. Exogenous (Political) Tests to the Sustainability
Although the constitutional adjudication by the WTO tribunal
may be firmly anchored by the WTO’s telos of anti-protectionism, and
thus self-sustaining from the standpoint of the WTO as an autonomous
international organization, such a macro, organizational sustainability is
yet to be tested by the member-driven political dynamics. Some
commentators cast serious doubts on the wisdom of constitutional
adjudication itself. According to them, constitutional adjudication may
be unsustainable because it tends to short-circuit the necessary and
proper political process which the subject-matter of adjudication should
have triggered. Therefore, they view that the AB’s interpretation must be
tightly controlled by political safeguards to prevent it from creeping into
the forbidden realm of constitutional adjudication.
For example, Jeffrey Dunoff found constitutional narratives
unpersuasive in general. Dunoff discovered a “puzzling disjunction” in
the debates of trade constitution between the “deep disciplinary
anxieties” of trade law scholars and a positivistic reality check that
“neither WTO texts nor practices suggest that the WTO is a
204 United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology,
WT/DS350/R, Panel Report circulated on Oct. 1, 2oo8, para. 7.169.
205 Id., para. 7.182.
206 AB Report, U.S. – Continued Zeroing, supra note _ , para. 312.
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constitutional entity.”207 He warned that constitutional discourse as a
rhetorical strategy adopted by trade law scholars might be “selfdefeating” in that it tends to invoke the very politics that it wants to
avoid. 208 Dunoff might find the vindication of his warning in
sovereigntists’ lambasting against the AB’s teleological interpretation.
In a similar fashion, one might submit that the very notion of
trade constitution or trade constitutionalism as an apolitical discipline
would be even undesirable. According to Klabbers, the “idea of
overcoming politics by insisting on adhering to certain fixed values”
would be unlikely to work since “reference to those values itself is
immensely and intensely political.”209 Furthermore, Robert Howse and
Kalypso Nicolaidis viewed that the WTO constitution as a Madisonian
pre-commitment to resist the rent-seeking protectionism by special
interest groups might be detrimental because “it is an attempt to take
politics out of the global equation when on the contrary it needs to be
brought back in.”210
All these criticisms are not without merits. In a formal matter, the
WTO panel or the AB is merely to “assist” the Dispute Settlement Body,
i.e., the General Council, to “settle” disputes between Members by
delivering their “recommendations.” 211 More importantly, these
recommendations should not “add to or diminish” members’ rights and
obligations. 212 Also, overemphasizing this judicial governance in the
WTO, especially through a constitutional lens, risks trivializing
recognizable political checks against the WTO panel or the AB,
including the possible overriding of any panel or the AB decision by the
WTO members’ “authoritative interpretation.” 213 These risks tend to
invite more fundamental criticisms regarding the WTO tribunal’s
alleged lack of accountability or more broadly the democracy deficit.
One of these critics contend that the WTO produce “quasiconstitutional” rules (“generativity”) flowing from the confidential WTO
tribunal (“insularity”). 214 According to this position, the WTO’s
Dunoff, supra note _, at 647, 649. He observed that “there is no constitutional court,
no constitutional convention, no constitutional drafting process, and no readily
identifiable constitutional moment.” and that “ on their face, the Uruguay Round texts
lack a number of features often associated with constitutional entities.” Id., at 650-51.
208 Id., at 649.
209 Jan Klabbers, Constitutionalism Lite, 1 INT'L ORG. L. REV. (2004) 31, 54 (quoted in
Dunoff, supra note _ , at 665)
210 See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why
Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND
LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENIUM 227 (Roger B.
Porter et al eds. 2001).
211 DSU, supra note _, art.19.1.
212 Id., arts. 3.2, 19.2
213 WTO Agreement, supra note _, art. 9.2.
214 Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 401, 415 (2000).
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substantive virtue, i.e., free trade, may become a potential threat to
democracy of its members, including (or especially) the U.S. in the
absence of any democratic disciplines, such as those under the U.S.’
Administrative Procedural Act.215
One might suspect that those political risks are a certain price
that WTO members should willingly pay to secure the integrity of “an
integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system.”216 Yet
these risks might not necessarily be high, in particular as long as
domestic political economy could accommodate the AB’s constitutional
adjudication. Judith Goldstein and Richard Steinberg insightfully
observed that the U.S. Congress has recently tolerated “de facto
delegation” of trade authority to the WTO’s judicial law-making
function. 217 They attributed such domestic political tolerance to the
WTO’s judicial activism to certain transformative features in the U.S.
trade politics.218 First, export-oriented producers have propped up their
lobbying effects as they have witnessed “a clear and credible loss” from
protection touted by import-competing groups. Second, trade
liberalization tends to be “self-reinforcing” since these protectionist
lobbies “peel off” as they become unable to sustain protection. Third,
domestic “elites and leaders” tend to regard trade liberalization and
market openness advantageous to the national interest.
2. Endogenous (Legal) Foundations for the Sustainability

Id., at 418-19. Ironically, the way in which certain Western countries administer
antidumping measures domestically fails to meet their own democratic standards. For
example, the U.S. Administrative Procedural Act does not apply to antidumping
proceedings, raising due process questions in the antidumping administration. See
Theodore W. Kassinger, Antidumping Duty Investigations, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF
UNITED STATES REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1, 16-20 (Charles R. Johnston, Jr.
ed., 1989); Hilary K. Josephs, The Multinational Corporation, Integrated
International Production, and the United States Antidumping Laws, 5 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 51, 66 (1997). See also Elof Hansson, Inc.v. United States, 41 Cust. Ct. 519,
528 (1958) (ruling that the APA was not applicable to dumping investigations).
Moreover, even if domestic industries’ first attempt does not prevail in an antidumping
complaint, they can re-file the same complaint until they eventually prevail because the
doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel does not apply to the antidumping
proceeding unlike other civil procedures. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a) & 1673a(a). See also
Josephs, supra note _, at 66.
216 WTO Agreement, supra note _, pmbl.
217 Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate?: Effects of WTO
Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW & ECONOMICS
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, No. 07-14, at 36-37.
218 Id.
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In contrast to the aforementioned exogenous (political) test, an
apolitical, i.e., normative, foundation for constitutional adjudication
derives nowhere but from an “internal” dimension of law, i.e., the way in
which members interpret, react and respond to those constitutional
decisions of the WTO tribunal, not as “one-time grudging compliance,”
but “habitual internalized obedience.”219
This self-legitimizing osmosis of constitutional adjudication from
the WTO level into the domestic legal realm does not remain a mere
academic imagination. Empirical confirmations are legion as to real
world examples of such legal osmosis. The reactions from the EU and
the U.S. government to the AB’s anti-zeroing decisions provide cases in
point. For example, although the EU was one of the long-standing users
of the zeroing practice, it has boldly changed its policy direction in a way
which fully conforms to the AB’s ruling since it lost the very first case in
EC – Bed Linen. Instead of resisting to the AB’s decisions, it has elected
to go after another main user, i.e., the U.S.220 Even the U.S. government
(DOC) has recently modified, albeit partially, its long-standing zeroing
practice in the weighted-average-to-weighted-average comparison in an
attempt to comply with the AB’s decisions, despite severe resistance
from the special interest groups as well as the Congress which is
captured by these groups.221
This legal osmosis or “internalization” of the WTO’s
constitutional adjudication leads to a symbiotic co-existence between
the WTO system and domestic legal regimes. In fact, trade constitution
can contribute even to achieving domestic constitutional goals since the
former can provide an effective check against a Madisonian failure
(parochialism) in the domestic arena.222 Public choice theorists teach us
that gains from trade are often underrepresented while its costs are
overrepresented. 223 Under these circumstances, constitutional
adjudication tends to empower local voices for free trade and
competition. For example, since the WTO rulings on zeroing the U.S.
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2655 (1997).
220 See supra pt. II, § C.
221 71 Fed. Reg. 77,722 (Dec. 27, 2006); Rossella Brevetti, Commerce Makes Change in
Dumping Methodology to Comply with WTO Case, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 26, Jan. 4,
2007. This is an example of internalization through “executive action,” such as the
change of administrative interpretation. Koh, supra note _ , at 2657.
222 See Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Regulatory Shift: The Rise of
Judicial Liberalization at the WTO, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW & ECONOMICS
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, No. 07-15, at 2-3 (arguing that the WTO’s regulatory shift
from the legislative to the judicial sector by “freeing member states from the capture by
entrenched domestic interests”).
223 See Sungjoon Cho, Toward a New Economic Constitution: Judicial Disciplines on
Trade Politics, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 167, 184-86 (2007).
219
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domestic consumer groups have stepped up their lobbying efforts to the
government with a view to the elimination of all zeroing practices which
serve the interests of certain domestic producers at the expense of U.S.
consumers and consuming industries.224
Even if certain domestic producers may attempt to preserve the
zeroing practice in the domestic court which usually renders huge
deference to agencies, such as the DOC, under the Chevron doctrine, the
court can still respect the decisions of the WTO (AB) under the
Charming Betsy doctrine, which prescribes that the U.S. law should be
interpreted in a way which is consistent with international law. 225 In
other words, between two possible statutory constructions of the
antidumping statute, i.e., one which does permit zeroing and the other
which does not, the U.S. court could choose the latter since the WTO
tribunal unambiguously ruled against zeroing. To this extent, any
modicum of deference which the DOC would have enjoyed under the
second prong of the Chevron is squeezed to nil.226
See Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC), Rebuttal Comments on
the Commerce Department’s “Zeroing” Proposal, May 4, 2006 (urging the Commerce
Department to “eliminate zeroing from all antidumping calculation methodologies”),
available
at
http://www.citac.info/about/issues/zeroing/CITAC_On_Zeroing_2300285_1.pdf.;
Robin Lanier, A Letter to Secretary of Commerce (Re: “Zeroing” of Duties), Jan. 6,
2005 (proposing to “eliminate the practice of zeroing in all dumping cases”). Harold
Koh defines this phenomenon as “legislative internalization” which “occurs when
domestic lobbying embeds international law norms into binding domestic legislation
or even constitutional law that officials of a noncomplying government must then obey
as part of the domestic legal fabric.” Koh, supra note _ , at 2657.
225 This situation may fall within the rubric of “judicial internalization” which Harold
Koh defines as an implicit incorporation of international law into the domestic legal
system through interpreting existing statutes harmoniously with international law or
as an explicit incorporation via “transnational public law litigation.” Koh, supra note _ ,
at 2657.
226 A recent North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Article 1904 binational
panel (the Mittal panel) has followed the AB’s anti-zeroing jurisprudence by invoking
the Charming Betsy doctrine. NAFTA Article 1904.2 requires this tribunal whose
mandate is a judicial review on government’s decisions on trade remedy issues such as
zeroing to apply the same laws, regulations and even standards of review which a court
of a defending country (the U.S. in this dispute). In this sense, the Mittal panel spoke
on behalf of the U.S. court. It ruled that “zeroing seems inconsistent (…) with both the
underlying principle of the Charming Betsy canon, to respect the law of nations
wherever possible, and the United States’ Uruguay Round negotiation goal of obtaining
an effective dispute-resolution system.” In the Matter of Carbon and Certain Alloy
Steel Wire Rod from Canada, USA-CDA-2006-1094-04, Nov. 28, 2007, at 38. But see
Elizabeth C. Seastrum, Chevron Deference and Charming Betsy: Is There a Place for
the Schooner in the Standard of Review of Commerce Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Determinations?, 13 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 229, 238-39 (2003)
(concluding that the Charming Betsy doctrine should not undermine the operation of
the Chevron doctrine).
224
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In sum, this “transnational legal process,” which internalizes the
WTO norms on zeroing via the executive, legislative and judicial
channels, continuously enhances the WTO members’ susceptibility of
the WTO’s constitutional adjudication. As WTO members repeat and
regularize this process, and thus as domestic law becomes enmeshed
with “sticky” international law,227 their compliance with the outcome of
constitutional adjudication becomes ever closer to a “default pattern.” 228
Furthermore, in most cases trade constitution is firmly in sync with
fundamental principles of domestic (constitutional) law, such as free
interstate commerce and anti-parochialism. This “sovereigntyenhancing” aspect of internalization reinforces its self-legitimizing
nature.229 Under these circumstances, members’ “loyalty” on the WTO
regime mitigates, or even replaces, their initial demand for “voice” or
threat of “exit.”230
V. Conclusion: Constitutional Culture in the WTO
This paper has challenged major critiques to the recent WTO case
law which has invalidated zeroing in a radical departure from the old
GATT case law legalizing the same practice. The paper has argued that
critics to the AB’s zeroing decisions misconstrue the nature of the WTO,
its judicial review, and sovereignty itself. The article has also
demonstrated why, and how, the recent WTO zeroing jurisprudence can
be appreciated as a form of constitutional adjudication. Finally, it has
contended that constitutional adjudication is self-legitimizing to the
extent that such adjudication communicates with the domestic legal
system via various forms of internalization, be it a judicial
accommodation, as regards the Charming Betsy doctrine, or a policy
change at the executive level. After all, compliance leads to legitimacy
insomuch as legitimacy renders compliance pull.
This mutually reinforcing dynamics between internalization and
legitimacy of constitutional adjudication on zeroing may crystallize into
a certain cultural phenomenon. In this regard, “constitutional culture”
may be defined as the “cultural cohesion that habitually accepts the
Koh, supra note _ , at 2654-55.
Id. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note _ , at 935 (observing that some international
tribunals’ rulings can “mobilize compliance constituencies to press governments to
adhere to their treaty obligations”) (emphasis added).
229 See ALVAREZ, supra note _ , at 618. Cf. Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy:
The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J.
INT’L L. 241, 272-73 (2008) (suggesting that inter-judicial coalitions could enhance
democratic governance).
230 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 76-105 (1970).
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propriety and necessity of constitutional compliance.” 231 In fact,
internalization itself is “constitutive” and thus facilitative of
constitutional culture.232 The WTO’s constitutional culture denotes the
“generally shared” and “intersubjective” understanding of the WTO’s
ultimate goal (telos) and the normative universe (nomos) in which such
goal is pursued. 233 Within the WTO’s nomos defined by its telos, an
unremitting interaction, or discourse, among members of the global
trading community forms, and fortifies, the WTO’s constitutional
culture via a communitarian mechanism of habituation.
Importantly, the constitutional culture should also be didactic.
The WTO’s constitutional jurisprudence, no matter how far it has been
evolved thus far, is still remote and inaccessible to ordinary people.
Most people, even scholars in this field, associate it with esoteric codes
which can be deciphered only by certain cognoscenti.234 Under such a
low level of awareness, the legal force cannot overcome the short-term
protectionist politics which is often well-organized and thus very
effective in capturing trade policy-makers. Therefore, the public should
become further educated on the issue of international trade law and
trade constitution so that well-informed deliberation, not misleading
protectionist banners, guides their political choices.235 The necessity of
public education and social marketing on the WTO’s constitutional
jurisprudence may be analogous to the reason why American citizens,
not only legal scholars, are taught on certain paramount constitutional
jurisprudence, such as Marbury and Brown. At this juncture, the
academia bears a critical responsibility of framing and dispersing
discourses on the trade constitution and constitutional adjudication.236
Such discourses will eventually provide the public with helpful heuristics
with which to better comprehend international trade law, thereby
paving a propitious ground for the WTO’s constitutional culture.
In conclusion, the WTO’s constitutional culture liberates us from
a long-standing “positivist nostrum” based on an outmoded belief that
Allan Ides, The Emerging Transnational Constitution: Introduction, 37 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 187, 188 (2003).
232 Koh, supra note _ , at 2646.
233 See notably Lang, supra note _, at 84-85, 95, 105-6 (employing a “constructivist”
perspective on the WTO system); Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (observing that “no set of legal institutions or
prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning.”); id.,
at 9 (defining nomos as a “present world constituted by a system of tension between
reality and vision”).
234 See Sungjoon Cho, A New Agenda for Peace: International Trade Law as a
Practical Discourse, in TRADE AS THE GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY?:
CRITICAL, HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 63 (Padideh Ala’i et al eds. 2006).
235 Id.
236 I owe this insight to David Gerber.
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“multilateral mechanisms for making global law, binding on the
international community as a whole, do not exist.” 237 Only this
liberation can disabuse trading nations of their misguided mercantilist
interests, which zeroing represents, and redefine their identities and
interests within the global trading system from impervious sovereign
entities to enlightened norm-builders.238

Alvarez, supra note _ , at 586-87.
See generally Cho, Gemeinschaft, supra note _. From a standpoint of sociological
institutionalism, Martha Finnermore envisioned “continuing and even increasing
adherence to multilateralism – even when it runs contrary to expressed national
interests – because it embodies some set of values central to the larger world culture.”
Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s
Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 339 (1996).
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